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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Do the Constitutions of the United States and Utah 
Prohibit Congressf The State of Utah and Salt Lake City from 
Interfering with or Preventing reception of Satellite Radio and 
Television transmissions by means of a Satellite Antenna by means 
of exercise of police powers or any other means? 
2. Does the Salt Lake City Ordinance Title 51 differentiate 
between types of Antennas and operate to interfere with or prevent 
reception of Satellite Radio and Television Transmission Signals? 
3. Are the Utah Circuit Courts and the Utah Court of 
Appeals Unofficial/ Unlawful and Unconstituional and void? 
4. Are all Acts of Utah legislation during the years 1975 
through 1989 Unofficial, Unconstitutional and void? 
5. Are all appointments requiring advise and consent of 
the Utah Senate void for the years 1975 through 1989, including 
the appointments to the circuit, district, appeals and supreme 
courts of Utah, because the Senators elect for those years 
all failed to file their oaths required by the Constitutions of 
and laws of the United States and Utah? 
6. Was due process of Law denied to defendant/petitioner? 
7. Was effective assitance of counsel denied petitioner? 
8. Is due process of law being denied petitioner because 
Michael D. Zimmerman, I. Daniel Stewart, Gordon R. Hal, R. Paul 
Van Dam, Edward T. Alter, Tom L. Allen, W. Val Oveson, Norman H. 
Bangerter and the members elect of the Utah legislature all did 
fail to file their required oaths of office within sixty days 
of the commencement of their respective terms of office, leaving 
each office vacant as a matter of law? 
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
The unofficial Utah court of appeals entered an order 
of affirmance on the 29th day of November 1989. There has been 
no rehearing. 
Utah Code Annotated Title 78, Section 2-2(5) was enacted 
by an unofficial legislature and is unconstitutional and void. 
There is no valid statutory authority for the supreme court of 
Utah to grant petitions for writs of certiorari. All legislation 
from 1975 through 1989 is unconstitutional and void. 
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Sections: 25-5-4; 52-1-2? 52-2-1;.- 61-1-1; 
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76-10-1603; 78-2-3. 
Salt Lake City Ordinances: 
Sections: 1.12.030 (1988) 
Title 51: 
Sections: 51-1-2; 51-5-6; 51-5-7; 51-8-1; 
51-5-23. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant/petitioner, Bruce P. Palmer was ordered 
to remove a satellite antennae from his property at 933 
Pennsylvania Place, Salt Lake City, Utah on December 17, 1987. 
He challenged the power of Salt Lake City to issue such an order 
and was cited by Craig Spangenber for having a satellite antenna 
in "front yard" on January 6, 1988. Trial was held on July 5, 
1988 in an unofficial third circuit court where an unofficial 
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jury returned a guilty verdict for an unauthorized structure 
in a front yard setback. Judgment was entered July 5, 1988 and 
sentence was imposed, a 200 dollar fine and 30 days in the Salt 
Lake County Jail. A Notice of appeal was filed on July 15, 1988. 
A docketing statement was filed, a transcript obtained and briefs 
were filed by both parties. Oral arguments were presented on the 
28th day of November 1989 and an Order of Affirmance was issed 
by the unofficial appeals court on 29 November 1989, this is 
a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Order of Affirmance 
on the grounds that both the trial and appeals court are unofficial 
and unconstitutional and due process has been denied. 
RELELEVANT FACTS 
Mr. Palmer has a satellite antenna on his nonconforming 
parcel of land in a nonconforming yard in front of the building 
on that 1501.25 square foot parcel of land which has none of 
the required front, back or side yards required by the Salt Lake 
City Code and his property is not subject to section 51-5-6 and 
51-5-7 which only apply to required yards having 4,000 or more 
square feet for a single family dwelling. 
Mr. Palmer was denied his business license because he would 
not remove the satellite antenna. Mr. Palmer's attorney, Don L. 
Bybee, subpoenaed no witnesses and failed to file the memorandum 
of law ordered by Floyd H. Gowans to be filed in support of the 
defendants motion to dismiss, thus denying effective assistance 
of counsel. Admission of 47 CFR 25.104 and 18 USCA 1367 and 
other relevant evidence of the applicable lav; were denied during 
the trial, and were ignored on appeal by use of a Rule 31 hearing 
and subsequent^ order ,on appeal, affirming the conviction. 
4 
ARGUMENTS 
1. The Constitution of the United States prohibits Congress 
from making any law respecting the establishment of religionf or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. U. S. Const. Amendment I. The Utah Constitution 
also prohibits any law to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. Therefore neither Congress nor Utah has 
the power to prevent Mr. Palmer or any other citizen from exercise 
of his inalienable rights to receive free speech or have access to 
the free press or to exercise his religion by means of a satellite 
antenna. His right to freedom of assembly is also infringed if 
Salt Lake City can impose a restraint or abridgement upon his 
rights protected under the U. S. And Utah Constitutions. Reception 
of satellite transmissions of free speech, press and religion is 
a protected right under both constitutions. The Salt Lake City 
Ordinance is therefore no law under the U. S. and Utah Constitutions 
and is a is an abuse of police powers, SLC Code 51-5-6 and 7 are 
Void as a matter of law and are unconstitutional. 
2. The Salt Lake City ordinance 51-5-6 mentions only one type 
or kind of antenna and prohibits all other kinds since it does not 
specifically mention any other type and is therefore preempted by 
47 CFR 25.104, which was adopted because cities were attempting 
to deprive people of their right to receive free speech and press 
and religion. Red lion Broadcasting vs. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
Van Meter v. Township of Haplewood, 696 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988). 
Maplewoods back yard only ordinance was declared preempted. 
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In Red Lion, supra, it was clearly stated by the court 
that the rights of the listening and viewing public are para-
mount. Salt Lake City's ordinance and Mr. Palmers prosecution 
under it are for the express purpose of denying him access to 
free speech and free press and to deprive him of religion by 
construing municipal police powers to included the power to 
interfere with and prevent public broadcast from being heard 
or seen by Mr. Palmer by means of satellite equipment on his 
property, thus depriving him of his right to own and control 
property under the Utah Constitutionand the U. S. Constitution 
Amendment VI, and denying equal protection of the FCC Preemption 
order and denying him constitutional rights. 
3. The Utah Circuit courts and the Utah Court of Appeals 
are Unofficial because the Utah Senate has failed to qualify for 
office by each Senator-elect failing to file his or her oath of 
office pursuant to the United States Constitution Article VI, 
I Stat 23, Utah Constitution Article IV, Section 10, and Utah 
Code Annotated, Sections 52-1-2, 52-2-1, and 76-8-203 which 
require the oath to be take and subscribed and filed and recorded 
before entering upon the duties of any legislative, executive 
or judicial office of the State of Utah. As of June 30, 1989, 
not a single oath of office for any senator-elect from 1975 to 
1989 was filed in the office of the Secretary of State or any 
other authorized office as required by 52-1-2. 
4. All acts of the Utah legislature were and are void for 
the years 1975 through 1989 because none of the Senators-elect 
filed their oaths of office for those years and every act of 
legislation during those15 years is the result of an unofficial 
act. 
5. All appointments requiring the advice and consent of the 
Utah Senate are void for the years 1975 through 1989 for the 
failure of the senators-elect to file the required oaths of 
and all senate offices became vacant as a matter of law 60 days 
after the terms began and all acts were unofficial and all 
consent to appointments failed on that ground and under the 
Constitutional and statutory provisions cited in argument 3. 
6. due process has been denied the defendant/petitioner 
because the the trial courts and the court of appeals were not 
official courts of the state of Utah and the judges thereof had 
not been duly appointed by a qualified senate therefore the 
whole Utah bar is disqualified and effective assistance of counsel 
is impossible under those conditions and the conduct of the courts 
is criminal under the provisions of 76-8-203, and every exercise 
of judicial power in Utah is unofficial* unconstitution an void 
for the years 1977 through 1989 in the circuit courts of Utah and 
in the Appeals court and in the other courts for the same reasons. 
7. Effective assitance of counsel was denied because the courts 
are unofficial, and the attorney failed to file papers, prepare 
for trial, subpoena witnesses or or use material provided him 
by the defendant, Mr. Palmer. 
8. Due process of law is being denied petitioner because 
Michael D. Zimmerman, I. Daniel Stewart, Gordon r. Hall, R. Paul 
Van Dam, Edward T. Alter, Tom L. Allen, W. Val Oveson, Norman H. 
Bangerter and the members elect of the Utah legislature all did 
fail to file their required oaths of office within sixty days of 
the commencement of their respective terms of office, and thus 
all offices are vacant as a matter of lav/, and all appointments 
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made since the terms began are unofficial and all acts thereunder 
are criminal violations of Utah Code Annotated 76-8-203. 
For the foregoing reasons certiorari should be granted if 
there were any provision of law that would allow for certiorari, 
but there is not because the laws are void that were enacted to 
provide for petitioning for writs of certiorari, thus due process 
is denied to the defendant/petitioner and enforcement of the 
void Salt Lake City Ordinance may well make the persons acting 
to enforce the void ordinance liable under criminal and civil 
violations of laws and rights of the accused, Mr, Bruce P. Palmer. 
Dated this 29th Day of December 1989, A.D. 
BRUCE P. PALMER 
Petitioner Pro SE 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certifiy that I mailed or hand delivered four 
copies of the foregoing petition for writ of certiorari 
to the office of The Salt Lake City Attorney at 451 South 
(200 EastSalt lake City, Utah on the 29th day of December 1989. 
Bruce P. Palmer 
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U»h Ceurt *i Appeals 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Vo 
Bruce P. Palmer, 
Defendant and Appellant* 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 880471-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Rule 31 Hearing) 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
DATED th is y_ L day o f November, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: J 
ory K./Orate-; Judge Greg 
COVER SHEET 
CASE TITLE: 
Salt Lake City Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. Case NOe 880471-CA 
Bruce P. Palmer, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PARTIES: 
Bruce P. Palmer (Argued) 
933 Pennsylvania Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Roger F. Cutler 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
Richard G. Hamp 
Bruce Baird (Argued) 
Assistant City Prosecutors 
451 South 200 East, Suite 125 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
TRIAL JUDGE: 
Honorable Floyd He Gowans 
November 29, 1989. ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE. 
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Rule 31 
Hearing). 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of November, 1989, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE was deposited in 
the United States mail or personally delivered to each of the above 
parties. 
y^/fc/ittf* ,. 
Deputy Clerk 
TRIAL COURT: / 
T h i r d C i r c u i t C o u r t , S a l t Lake D e p t . Nd\ 881000374CM 
RED LION BROADCASTING CO. v. FCC. o^9 
Syllabus. 
RED LION BROADCASTING CO., INC., ET AL. V. 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO T H E UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. 
No. 2. Argued April 2-^ 3, 1969.—Decided June 9, 1969.* 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has for many 
years imposed on broadcasters a "fairness doctrine," requiring that 
public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side of 
those issues be given fair coverage. In No. 2, the FCC declared 
that petitioner Red Lion Broadcasting Co. had failed to meet its 
obligation under the fairness doctrine when it carried a program 
which constituted a personal attack on one Cook, and ordered it to 
send a transcript of the broadcast to Cook and provide reply time, 
whether or not Cook would pay for it. The Court of Appeals 
upheld the FCC's position. After the commencement of the 
Red Lion litigation the FCC began a rule-making proceeding to 
make the personal attack aspect of the fairness doctrine more 
precise and more readily enforceable, and to specify its rules 
relating to political editorials. The rules, as adopted and amended, 
were held unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in RTNDA 
(No. 717), as abridging the freedoms of speech and press. Held: 
1. The history of the fairness doctrine and of related legislation 
shows that the FCC's action in the Red Lion case did not exceed 
its authority, and that in adopting the new regulations the FCC 
was implementing congressional policy. Pp. 375-386. 
(a) The fairness doctrine began shortly after the Federal 
Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies among 
competing applicants in the public interest, and insofar as there 
is an affirmative obligation of the broadcaster to see that both 
sides are presented, the personal attack doctrine and regulations 
do not differ from the fairness doctnne. Pp. 375-379 
(b) The FCC's statutory mandate to see that broadcasters 
operate in the public interest and Congress' reaffirmation, in the 
•Together with No. 717, United States et al. v. Radio Television 
News Directors Assn et al., on certiorari to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued April 3, 1969. 
36# OCTOBER TERM, 1968. 
J/C 
•
p
 Syllabus. 395 U.S. 
1959 amendment to §315 of the Communications Act, of the 
FCC's view that the fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest 
standard, support the conclusion that the doctrine and its com-
ponent personal attack and political editorializing reguh tions are 
a legitimate exercise of congressionally delegated authority. Pp. 
379-386. 
2. The fairness doctrine and its specific manifestations in the 
personal attack and political editorial rules do not violate the 
First Amendment Pp. 386-401. 
(a) The First Amendment is relevant to public broadcasting, 
but it is the right of the viewing and listening public, and not 
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. Pp. 386-390. 
(b) The First Amendment does not protect private censorship 
by broadcasters who are licensed by the Government to use a 
scarce resource which is denied to others. Pp. 390-392. 
(c) The danger that licensees will eliminate coverage of con-
troversial issues as a result of the personal attack and political 
editorial rules is at best speculative, and, in any event, the FCC 
has authonty to guard against this danger. Pp. 392«-395. 
(d) There was nothing vague about the FCC's specific ruling 
in the Red Lion case and the regulations at issue in fto. 717 
could be employed in precisely the same way as the fairness doc-
trine in Red Lion. It is not necessary to decide every aspect of 
the fairness doctrine to decide these cases. Problems involving 
more extreme applications or more difficult constitutional questions 
will be dealt with if and when they arise. Pp. 395-396. 
(e) It has not been shown that the scarcity of broadcast fre-
quencies, which impelled governmental regulation, is entirely a 
thing of the past, as new uses for the frequency spectrum have 
kept pace with unproved technology and more efficient utilization 
of that spectrum. Pp. 396-400. 
No. 2, 127 U. S. App. D. C. 129, 381 F. 2d 908, affirmed; No. 717, 
400 F. 2d 1002, reversed and remanded. 
Roger Rohb argued the cause for petitioners in No, 2. 
With him on the brief were H. Donald Kistler and 
Thomas B. Sweeney. Solicitor General Griswold argued 
the cause for the United States and the Federal Com-
munications Commission, petitioners in No. 717 and 
respondents in No. 2. With him on the brief were 
0 9 Li 
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367 Opinion of the Court. 
Assistant Attorney General McLaren, Deputy Solicitor 
General Springer, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Henry Geller, 
and Daniel R. Ohlbaum. 
Archibald Cox argued the cause for respondents in 
No. 717. With him on the brief for respondents Radio 
Television News Directors Assn. et al. were W. Theodore 
Pierson, Harold David Cohen, Vernon C. Kohlhaas, and 
/ . Laurent Scharff. On the brief for respondent National 
Broadcasting Co.; Inc., were Lawrence J. McKay, Ray-
mond L. Falls, Jr., Corydon B. Dunham, Howard Mon-
derer, and Abraham P. Ordover. On the brief for 
respondent Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., were 
Lloyd N. Cutler, / . Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk, 
Robert V. Evans, and Herbert Wechsler. 
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 717 and 
affirmance in No. 2 were filed by Melvrn L. Wulj and 
Eleanor Holmes Norton for the American Civil Liberties 
Union, and by Earle K. Moore and William B. Ball for 
the Office of Communication of the United Church of 
Christ et al. / . Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Thomas 
E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of 
Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations urging 
reversal in No. 717. 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Federal Communications Commission has for 
many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters 
the requirement that discussion of public issues be 
presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of 
those issues must be given fair coverage. This is known 
as the fairness doctrine, which originated very early in 
the history of broadcasting and has maintained its pres-
ent outlines for some time. It is an obligation whose 
content has been defined in a long series of FCC rulings 
in particular cases, and which is distinct from the statu-
388 OCTOBER TERM, 1968. 
Opinion of the Court. 395 U. 8. 
incomparably greater than the range of the human voice 
and the problem of interference is a massive reality* 
The lack of know-how and equipment may keep many 
from the air, but only a tiny fraction of those with re-
sources and intelligence can hope to communicate by 
radio at the same time if intelligible communication is 
to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is utilized in 
the present state of commercially acceptable technology. 
It was this fact, and the chaos which ensued from 
permitting anyone to use any frequency at whatever 
power level he wished, which made necessary the enact-
ment of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications 
Act of 1934,14 as the Court has noted at length before. 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 XL S. 
190, 210-214 (1943), It was this reality which at the 
very least necessitated first the division of the radio 
spectrum into portions reserved respectively for public 
broadcasting and for other important radio uses such as 
amateur operation, aircraft, police, defense, and naviga-
tion; and then the subdivision of each portion, and assign-
ment of specific frequencies to individual users or groups 
of users. Beyond this, however, because the frequencies 
reserved for public broadcasting were limited in number, 
it was essential for the Government to tell some appli-
cants that they could not broadcast at all because there 
was room for only a few. 
Where there are substantially more individuals who 
want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, 
it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right 
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual 
to speak, write, or publish. If 100 persons want broad-
1#The range of controls *hich have in fact been imposed over 
the last 40 years, without giving use to successful constitutional 
challenge in this Court, is discussed in W Emery, Broadcasting and 
Government: Responsibilities and Regulations (1961); Note, Regu-
lation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 701 (1964). 
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cast licenses but there are only 10 frequencies to allocate, 
all of them may have the same "right" to a license; 
but if there is to be any effective communication by 
radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be 
barred from the airwaves. It would be strange if the 
First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering 
communications, prevented the Government from making 
radio communication possible by requiring licenses to 
broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as 
not to overcrowd the spectrum. 
This has been the consistent view of the Court. Con-
gress unquestionably has the power to grant and deny 
licenses and to eliminate existing stations. FRC v. Xelson 
Bros. Bond it Mortgage Co., 2S9 U. S. 266 (1933). No 
one has a First Amendment right to a license or to 
monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license 
because "the public interest" requires it "is not a denial 
of free speech." Xational Broadcasting Co. v. United 
States, 319 U. S. 190. 227 (1943). 
By the same token, as far as the First Amendment 
is concerned those who are licensed stand no better 
than those to whom licenses are refused. A license 
permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no consti-
tutional right to be the one who holds the license or 
to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of 
his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First 
Amendment which prevents the Government from re-
quiring a liconsee to share his frequency with others and 
to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obliga-
tions to present those views and voices which are repre-
sentative oi his community and which would otherwise, 
by necessity, be barred from the airwaves. 
This is not to say that the First Amendment is irrele-
vant to public broadcasting. On the contrary, it has a 
major role to play as the Congress itself recognized in 
3 326, which forbids FCC interference with "the right 
n 
390 OCTOBER TERM, 1968. 
Opinion of the Court, 395 U. S. 
of free speech by means of radio communication." 
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Gov-
ernment is permitted to put restraints on licensees 
in favor of others whose views should be expressed 
on this unique medium. But the people as a whole 
retain their interest in free speech by radio and their 
collective right to have the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First 
Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. 
See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 
475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 
U. S. 3.58, 361-362 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and 
Mass Communications 546 (1947). It is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited market-
place of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, 
rather than to countenance monopolization of that 
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a 
private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326 
U. S. 1. 20 (1945); iXew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U. S. 254. 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 
616, 630 (1919; (Holmes, J., dissenting). "[SJpeech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it 
is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Loui-
siana. 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See Brennan, The 
>\:>rrvne Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the 
F:>t Amendment. 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). It is the 
fight of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences 
which is crucial here. That right may not constitu-
tionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC. 
B. 
Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a rela-
tively small number of licensees, in a Nation of 200,-
000,000, the Government could surely have decreed that 
O 
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each frequency should be shared among all or some of 
those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion 
of the broadcast day or the broadcast week. The ruling 
and regulations at issue here do not go quite so far. They 
assert that under specified circumstances, a licensee must 
offer to make available a reasonable amount of broadcast 
time to those who have a view different from that which 
has already been expressed on his station. The ex-
pression of a political endorsement, or of a personal 
attack while dealing with a controversial public issue, 
simply triggers this time sharing. As we have said, the 
First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent 
others from broadcasting on "their" frequencies and no 
right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource 
which the Government has denied others the right to use. 
In terms of constitutional principle, and as enforced 
sharing of a scarce resource, the personal attack and 
political editorial rules are indistinguishable from the 
equal-time provision of § 315, a specific enactment of 
Congress requiring stations to set aside reply time under 
specified circumstances and to which the fairness doctrine 
and these constituent regulations are important comple-
ments. That provision, which has been part of the 
law since 1927. Radio Act of 1927, § 18, 44 Stat. 1170, 
has been held valid by this Court as an obligation of the 
licensee relieving him of any power in any way to pre-
vent or censor the broadcast, and thus insulating him 
from liability for defamation. The constitutionality of 
the statute under the First Amendment was unques-
tioned.17 Farmers Educ. <£ Coop. Union v. WD AY, 360 
U. S. 525 (1959). 
17
 This has not prevented vigorous argument from developing on 
the constitutionality of the ancillary FCC doctrines. Compare 
Barrow, The Equal Opportumnes and Fairness Doctrines in Broad-
casting: Pillars in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. Cm. L. Rev. 447 
(19GS), with Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Obser-
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and the asbestos NESHAP regulations. 
Defendants have also failed to comply with 
the compliance orders issued to them by 
EPA. The Government has established a 
reasonable probability of success on the 
merits, the likelihood of irreparable injury 
if the asbestos in the hotel is not properly 
disposed of, and that a balancing of hard-
ships favors granting an injunction. Be-
cause it is so clearly in the public interest 
to grant a preliminary injunction enjoining 
defendants to secure the facility, properly 
dispose of the ACM, and comply with 
EPA's orders, the Government's motion is 
granted. 
J^\ , 
Kelly I VAN METER and Lauren J. 
Van Meter, PiatntifTs, 
v. 
TOWNSHIP OF 
MAPLEWOOD. Defendant. 
Civ. A. No. 87-4677. 
United States District Court, 
D. New Jersey. 
Oct. 13, 1988. 
Homeowners brought action challeng-
ing ordinance which limited type of satellite 
dish antenna which they could install on 
their land. The District Court, Debevoise, 
J., held that: (1) abstention was not re-
quired, and (2) ordinance reasonably re-
stricted reception of authorized satellite 
signals, and thus was preempted by Feder-
al Communications Commission order regu-
lating satellite dish antenna reception. 
Judgment for plaintiffs. 
1. Federal Courts <*^ 41 
Abstention, in its various manifesta-
tions, is a prudential doctrine applied to 
further comity, federalism, and judicial 
economy; in certain limited circumstances, 
federal court should abstain from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction where state proceeding 
involving the same dispute is pending. 
2. Federal Courts «=»6€ 
Younger abstention did not apply to 
federal civil rights suit challenging local 
zoning ordinance regulating television an-
tennas where municipality had agreed to 
stay prosecution of ita municipal court com-
plaint for zoning violations until resolution 
of summary judgment motion in federal 
court. 
3. Federal Courts *=M1 
Younger abstention did not apply to 
any administrative remedy which might 
have been available to federal court plain-
tiffs where no proceeding was pending be-
fore any administrative body. 
4. Federal Courts *=»S£ 
Pullman abstention was not applicable 
in federal civil rights suit brought by home-
owners challenging ordinance regulating 
television antennas where the ordinance 
was clear and unmistakable on its face. 
5. Civil Right* *=»13.9 
Exhaustion of state administrative 
remedies is not required before initiating 
federal civil rights action. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983c 
6. Civil Right* «=»13.4(1) 
Congressional legalization of reception 
of authorized satellite television signals 
permitted homeowners to bring federal civ-
il rights action against township whose zon-
ing ordinance allegedly interfered with fed-
eral regulation of satellite television signal 
reception. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Communi-
cations Act of 1934, § 705<a, b), as amend-
ed, 47 U.S.C.A. § 605<a, b). 
7. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=»229 
Exhaustion of remedies is inappropri-
ate where administrative proceedings avail-
able to the plaintiffs are not adequate 
forms for their federal claims and will not 
materially advance resolution of federal 
claims. 
|o 
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8. Administrative Law and Procedure 
Exhaustion doctrine is inappropriate 
where federal plaintiff faces state criminal 
prosecution under state statute which he 
challenges as racially invalid and where 
state administrative body is without compe-
tence to resolve that claim. 
9. Municipal Corporations <*=»53 
States <8=»18.9 
Federal regulation may preempt state 
or local law if the agency intended to exer-
cise exclusive authority in the area and the 
agency is legally authorized to displace 
state or local regulation. 
10. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<*~70! 
Telecommunication* <s»443.20 
Federal district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider whether 
Federal Communications Commission ex-
ceeded its authority in issuing regulation 
preempting state or local zoning with re-
spect to satellite television antennas. Com-
munications Act of 1934, § 405, as amend-
ed, 47 U.S.C.A. § 405. 
11. Zoning and Planning <s=M4 
Ordinance limiting size and location of 
satellite dish antennas was an attempt to 
dimmish visual impact of antennas and 
thus had clearly defined health, safety, or 
aesthetic objective for purposes of FCC 
order allowing certain types of state and 
local regulation of those antennas. 
12. Zoning and Planning <c=M4 
Ordinance limiting satellite dish anten-
nas to six feet in diameter and to place-
ment on the ground with proper screening 
unreasonably interfered with recepuon in 
area in which ten-foot dishes were required 
for adequate reception and in which anten-
nas needed an elevation alignment of 14 
degrees above the horizon, and thus was 
preempted by FCC order. 
13. Zoning and Planning <£=>14 
Ordinance under which satellite dish 
antenna users who could not achieve recep-
tion within constraints imposed by ordi-
nance could apply for zoning variance 
would not be satisfactory and would not 
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save ordinance, which placed an unreason-
able restriction on single reception, from 
preemption by Federal Communications 
Commission order 
Schenck, Price. Smith & King by W 
James MacNaughton. Momstown, N-J., for 
plaintiffs. 
Scarpone & Edelson, P.A. by Irwin P. 
Burzynski, Michael Edelson, Val Mandel, 
Newark, NJ. f for defendant. 
OPINION 
DEBEVOISE, District Judge. 
This case involves homeowners who in-
stalled an antenna to receive satellite tele-
viaioa signals ui cemtravetvuaa. oC a local 
zoning ordinance. Plaintiff homeowners 
claim that the ordinance is invalidated by 
federal law They seek nummary judg-
ment on their claims for declaratory and 
injunctive relief and attorney's fees. De-
fendant municipality cross-moves for dis-
missal of plaintiffs' claims and to amend its 
answer to assert a defense of failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
Background 
Plsmtiffs Kelly Van Meter and his wife 
Lauren are residents of Maplewood. a 
small, suburban community in northern 
New Jersey. In late 1985. plaintiffs decid-
ed to purchase a satellite television receive-
only antenna, known as a "TVRO" or 
"earth station", that would enable them to 
receive television signals transmitted di-
rectly from satellites and view them on a 
television monitor. After researching the 
technology and consulting with a vendor, 
plaintiffs purchased a TVRO "dish anten-
na", also known as a "parabolic antenna" 
because of its shallow dish shape, at a cost 
of $2500 installed. The plaintiffs' dish an-
tenna is ten feet in diameter and composed 
pnmanly of black anodized wire mesh. 
In December of 1987, plaintiffs' antenna 
vendor performed a site survey of the Van 
Meter property in order to determine the 
optimal site for the placement of the diah 
antenna. The results of the survey indi-
cated that, given the characteristics of 
1/ 
1026 696 F E D E R A L S U P P L E M E N T 
plaintiffs' lot, the antenna would have to be 
mounted on the roof to enable plaintiffs to 
receive s ignals from all of the available 
satellite television channels . 
At the time of their purchase, plaintiffs 
were aware of a zoning ordinance enacted 
by the Maplewood Township Committee 
(the "Committee") that governed the instal-
lation of dish antennas . The "Maplewood 
Dish Antennae Zoning Ordinance" (the 
"Ordinance") became ef fect ive June 6. 
1985. Among i ts provisions, the Ordinance 
forbids the use of a dish antenna greater 
than six feet in height "measured at the 
highest point of its outer circumference or 
extension/* requires that the dish be placed 
in the rear yard, es tabl ishes minimum set-
backs from property lines and buildings 
and requires that the dish be "screened 
from view . . . by evergreen planting which 
shall be at l eas t six feet in height at the 
tame of planting." (A complete copy of the 
Ordinance is s e t out in the Appendix to this 
Opinion). 
On May 24, 1986, plaintiffs wrote the 
township construction official seeking a 
variance from the Ordinance to allow them 
to place the antenna on their garage roof. 
The construction official. Robert Mittermai-
er. wrote the Van Meters on Apnl 1, 1986, 
and informed them that the placement they 
proposed was "not acceptable" and denied 
their "application for permission"' to erect a 
dish antenna. 
Plaintiffs at tempted to appeal Mittenmai-
er's decision to the township's Board of 
Zoning Adjustment (the "Board"). They 
allege that a l though they complied with the 
procedures for appeal as explained by Mit-
termaier. he rejected the application be-
cause notice of publication w a s not timely 
served on the municipality. According to 
plaintiffs, Mittermaier, and later the mayor 
of the township, informed the plaintiffs 
that an appeal to the Board would be futile. 
Defendant d isputes these al legations. 
After learning of an order of the Federal 
Communications Commission ("FCC") that 
plaintiffs believed permitted the installa-
tion of their antenna without regard to the 
local Ordinance, plaintiffs installed the an-
tenna on the roof of their house. On May 
5, 1987, plaintiffs received a summons for 
violation of the Ordinance and were or-
dered to appear before the municipal court 
on May 19, 1987. That summons is still 
pending. 
On N o v e m b e r 11, 1987, plaintiffs filed 
this action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 claim-
ing that the Ordinance is preempted by 
FCC regulat ion and that it violates their 
First A m e n d m e n t rights to receive satellite 
television s igna l s . T h e y seek injunctive 
and declaratory relief and ask for attor-
ney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988. 
4^ bs tendon 
[1] A l though not raised directly as a 
bar to this action by defendant , I must first 
address the i s sue of abstention. Absten-
tion, in its various manifestat ions , is a pru-
dential doctrine applied to further comity, 
federalism and judicial economy. In cer-
tain limited c ircumstances , a federal court 
should abstain from exerc i s ing its jurisdic-
tion where a s t a t e proceeding involving the 
same dispute is pending, Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.CL 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 
669 (1971); Williams v. Red Bank Bo. of 
Educ, 662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir.1981). where 
allowing a s ta te court to construe its chal-
lenged s ta tu te could avoid the necessity of 
reaching any const i tut ional issue. Railroad 
Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496, 61 S.CL 643. 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), 
or where the i s sue involves a complex, com-
prehensive bo<iy of s ta t e regulation over an 
area of traditionally local interest, Burford 
v. Sun Oil Co.. 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.CL 1098. 
87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). Al though abstention 
reflects sensi t iv i ty to s ta te sovereignty, its 
application is not the resul t of mere defer-
ence but ref lects an accommodation be-
tween s tate and federal interests . 
[2] The doctrine first announced in 
Younger, s u p r a , prevents a federal court 
from hearing a case involving strong and 
compelling s ta te interests where a proceed-
ing between the same parties and involving 
the same i s sues is pending in the state 
courts. In the present case , a summons 
was issued to the plaintiffs for violation of 
the Ordinance on May 7, 1986. While 
Younger- principles m i g h t arguably require 
abstention in this instance, here defendant 
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states that "Maplewood . . . has agreed to 
stay the prosecution of its Municipal Court 
complaint against Van Meter until after 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is 
decided." Because defendant has voluntar-
ily submitted to the jurisdiction of this 
court, therefore, the values underlying 
Younger are not implicated and its pruden-
tial constraints do not apply. Ohio Civil 
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian 
Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626, 106 S.Ct. 
2718, 2722, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986); Brown 
v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees and 
Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 
491, 500 n. 9. 104 S.Ct. 3179, 3184 n. 9, 82 
L.Ed.2d 373 (1984); Ohio Bureau of Em-
ployment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 
471, 480, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 1904. 52 L.Ed.2d 
513 (1977). 
[3) Nor does Younger abstention apply 
to any administrative remedy which may 
have been available to plaintiffs through 
the township's Board of Adjustment be-
cause no proceeding is pending before that 
body. Plaintiffs twice attempted to obtain 
a variance from the Board. Their first 
letter, requesting a "zoning variance hear-
ing at the next town meeting," was treated 
as an "application for permission" to erect 
a dish antenna and "denied" by the town-
ship construction official who also informed 
plaintiffs of their right to appeal his deci-
sion to the Board. Plaintiff discussed the 
notice requirements for a hearing applica-
tion before the Board with the construction 
official and then completed and filed an 
"Application for Hearing" and had a public 
notice of an appeal for a variance printed in 
the local newspaper. According to plain-
tiffs' certification, however, the construc-
tion official refused to accept the applica-
tion because he claimed not to have re-
ceived proof of publication in sufficient 
time. Defendant does not claim that a 
variance application is now pending and it 
is clear that the unappealed decision of a 
municipal administrative official is not a 
pending proceeding within the meaning of 
the Younger doctrine. 
[41 Pullman abstention requires a fed-
eral court to abstain when difficult and 
unsettled questions of state law must be 
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resolved before a federal question can be 
decided. The "relevant inquiry" under the 
Pullman doctrine, as the Supreme Court 
observed in Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Mid-
kiff. 467 U.S. 229. 237, 104 S.Ct 2321, 2327, 
81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) "ia not whether there 
is a bare, though unlikely, possibility that 
state courts might render adjudication of 
the federal question unnecessary.'9 Rath-
er, the question is whether the statue is of 
an uncertain nature and " 'obviously sus-
ceptible of a limiting construction.' " /<£, 
quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 
251 and n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 391. 397 and n. 14, 
19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). Pullman absten-
tion is inappropriate here. The language 
of the Ordinance is clear and unmistakably 
on its face and no difficult area of state 
law is presented for interpretation. More-
over, Pullman abstention is inappropriate 
in cases involving a claim of preemption. 
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 
185 (3d Cir.1980). 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
I must next address defendant's claim 
that plaintiffs' complaint should be dis-
missed for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies. 
(5.61 Exhaustion of state administra-
tive remedies is not required before initiat-
ing an action under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. 
Patsy v. Florida Bo. of Regents, 457 U.S. 
496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). 
A section 1983 action may be brought for 
the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. 
sec. 1983. Congress legalized the reception 
of authorized or unencrypted satellite tele-
vision signals under the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984 (the "Cable Act"), 
as discussed at greater length below, and 
the FCC, in turn, issued the Order to mini-
mize interference with satellite television 
reception. This permits plaintiffs to bring 
a Section 1983 action for interference with 
this federal scheme. Maine v. ThiboutoU 
448 U.S. 1, 100 S.CL 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 655 
(1980); see also, e.g.. Kennecott Corp., ru* 
pro, 637 F.2d at 186 n. 5 (section 1983 
action may be brought for federal statu-
/3 
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tory rights protected by Williams Act); 
Pietroniro v. OceanporU 764 F.2d 976, 980 
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 
S.Ct- 570, 88 L.Ed.2d 554 (1985) ("In the 
absence of a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme within the regulatory scheme 
*rhich encompasses plaintiffs8 complaint," 
there is a private cause of action through 
section 1983 to redress state's failure to 
provide housing relocation assistance under 
Housing Act of 1949 and Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance and Real Property Acquisi-
tion Policies Act of 1970). Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is therefore not a 
t>ar to this action. 
[7] Exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies is further inappropriate in this in-
stance because the administrative proceed-
ings available to plaintiffs arc not adequate 
forums for their federal claims and would 
not materially advance the resolution of 
this controversy. See, e.g.. Republic In-
dus., Inc. v. Central Pennsylvania Team* 
$tcr* Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 295 (3d 
Cir. 1982); Cerro Metal Prods, v. Marshall, 
620 F.2d 964, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1980). The 
Board's functions are narrowly limited to 
technical matters involving review of deci-
sions of administrative officers of the 
Board, interpretations of zoning maps and 
ordinances and the granting of variances. 
See NJ.S.A. sec. 40:G5D-70. Its proceed-
ing's are not bound by the rules of evi-
dence. N-XS.A. Bee. 40:55D-10<e). Ap-
peals from a Board decision may be taken 
to the municipality's governing body, in 
this case the township committee, only "if 
permitted by [township] ordinance." NJ . 
ScA. sec. 40:55D-17(a). Even then, appeals 
Are limited to the Board's decisions on spe-
cial use variances. Id*; Nickerson v. New-
ark, 220 NJ.Super. 284, 531 A.2d 1095 
(L.Div.1987). To require exhaustion of an 
administrative process that is without com-
petence to consider plaintiffs claims would 
merely delay the ultimate resolution of this 
dispute. 
[8 ! Finally, invocation of the exhaustion 
doctrine is also inappropriate where a fed-
eral plaintiff faces state criminal prosecu-
tion under a statute he challenges as facial-
ly invalid and where the state administra-
tive body is without competence to resolve 
the tflaim. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 
U.S. 494, 497 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1934 a. 5, 
52 L>Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plaintiff facing qua-
si-criminal proceeding for violation of local 
zoning ordinance not required to seek zon-
ing variance). 
Siiice I conclude that plaintiffs are not 
required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies, defendant's motion to amend its an-
swer to assert this affirmative defense is 
denied as futile. 
The FCC Order 
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984 (the "Act") 
amending the Communications Act of 1934. 
The main thrust of this legislation is to 
assure that the exploding market for cable 
television technology provides the widest 
possible diversity of information services to 
the public. See House Committer on Ener-
gy
 and Commerce, Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, H.R.Rep. No. 80-934, 
98th Cong., 2d Seas. 19, reprinted in part 
in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 
4655, 4656. Recognizing that cable suppli-
ers often rely on encrypted satellite trans-
mission feeds which they then distribute 
through the cable distribution network to 
home viewers, the Act also provided for 
stiffened penalties for unauthorized satel-
lite video users who intercept and decode 
these "pirated" messages for private use. 
See 47 U.S.C. 606<a). This provision also 
contains a limited exception to liability for 
direct reception of unencrypted and autho-
rized reception of encrypted satellite tele-
vision transmissions. Id* at sec. 605(h). 
Congress apparently believed that unre-
stricted market forces embodied in the pur-
chasing decisions made by individual con-
sumers would be the best means of deter-
mining the viability of this information dis-
tribution technology. See 120 Cong.Rec. 
S14.286 (Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Packwood) reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code 
Cong. <& Admin.News, 4742, 4747. 
Relying in part on the Cable Act's satel-
lite television provisions, see 51 Fed.Reg. 
5519, 5522 (1986), the FCC issued an Order 
entitled "Preemption of local zoning of 
earth stations," found at 47 C.F.R. sec. 
-5 "f 
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25.104. The Order provides, in relevant 
part, that: 
State and local zoning or other regula-
tions that differentiate between satellite 
receive-only antennas and other types of 
antenna facilities are preempted unless 
such regulations: 
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly de-
fined health, safety or aesthetic objec-
tive; and 
(b) Do not operate to impose unreason-
able limitations on, or prevent, reception 
of satellite delivered signals by receive-
only antennas or to impose costs on the 
users of such antennas that are exces-
sive in light of the purchase and installa-
tion cost of the equipment. 
47 C.F.R. sec. 25.104. 
Plaintiffs assert that this Order 
preempts the Maplewood Ordinance. 
Preemption of the Ordinance 
(91 A federal regulation may preempt 
state or local law if (1) the agency intended 
to exercise exclusive authority in the area 
and (2) if the agency is legally authorized 
to displace state or local regulation. New 
York v. FCC U.S. . , 
108 S.CL 1637, 16-41-44, 100 L.Ed.2d 48 
(TJ88). The intent of the FCC is clear on 
the face of the Order which explicitly pro-
vides that local regulation inconsistent with 
its requirements is preempted. 
(101 The second step of the New York 
test and defendant's assertion that the FCC 
exceeded its authonty present identical in-
quiries. This court, however, lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider the question. 
Before an FCC order is submitted to judi-
cial review, the FCC must have been given 
the opportunity to reconsider its position. 
47 U.S.C. sec. 405; Pcona v. General Elec. 
Cablewsxon Corp, 61)0 F.2d 116. 121 (7th 
Cir.1982). Although 47 U.S.C. sec. 405 
specifies that a petition for reconsideration 
must be filed within thirty days of the 
Commission's decision, this provision has 
been interpreted merely to provide the 
Commission with a "fair opportunity" to 
t. I note in passing thai ih« Supreme Court re-
cently sustained (he FCCs authority to issue 
regulations preempting local cable regulation 
enacted in the wake of the Cable Act s passage. 
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consider the issues. Meredith Corp. v. 
FCC 809 F.2d 863 (D.C.Cir.1987); Peoria, 
supra* 690 F.2d at 119. Thus defendant 
may raise his arguments before the com-
mission in a motion for a declaratory judg-
ment, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.2, o r i n a petition for 
repeal of the Order, 47 C.F.R. sec. 1.401. 
Judicial review may only then be sought 
from the Court of Appeals. 47 U.S.C. 
405<a); 23 U.S.C. sec. 2342(1). In the inter-
ests of judicial economy, I will assume 
without deciding that the Order was a valid 
exercise of authonty by the Commission 
and proceed on to the balance of the pre-
emption analysis.1 
The preemption issue presented here is 
unusual because the federal regulation it-
self establishes standards that govern 
whether and to what de^rre^ the local regu-
lation is preempted. 
The threshold determination under the 
Order is whether the challenged regulation 
differentiates between TVRO's and other 
types of antenna facilities. The Ordinance 
clearly applies to "dish antennae . . . or 
satellite receiving stationfs]." Ordinance 
sec. 2.1. It differentiates between TVRO 
antennas and transmitting dish antennas 
by forbidding the use of the latter entirely. 
Id. at sec. 2.3. The Ordinance does not 
apply to UHF and VHF television, FM ra-
dio, or ham and short-wave radio antennas. 
Thus the Ordinance effectively discrimi-
nates between different types of antennas. 
[ I l l The Order next provides that in 
order to avoid preemption, the local regula-
tion must have a reasonable, clearly de-
fined health, safety or aesthetic objective. 
The Ordinance passes this test. Satellite 
dish antennas are large and rather unsight-
ly. Although it does not state its purposes 
explicitly, the Ordinance is clearly an at-
tempt to diminish the visual impact of the 
antennas by requiring that they be install-
ed in the rear yard and, where they can be 
viewed from the street or adjoining proper-
ties, requiring that the installation be 
screened with tall shrubbery. Some safety 
.V*w York v. FCC. U.S. . 10S S.CL 1637. 
100 L-EdJId 48 (1988). The Court did noi di-
rectly consider the FCC Order in question, how-
ever. 
lb' 
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purposes might also be achieved by pre-
venting dish antenna roof placement and 
by establishing height limitations in order 
to avoid the hazards of a fallen or wind-
blown antenna. 
Finally, the Ordinance also must not pre-
vent or impose unreasonable limitations on 
reception or impose costs on the user dis-
proportionate to his total investment in an-
tenna equipment and installation. In order 
to make this evaluat ion I must first digress 
to consider how satel l i te television signals 
are received. I draw this explanation from 
the undisputed affidavit submitted by 
plaintiffs' TVRO vendor and installer, the 
article submitted by defendant, Harry B. 
Roth, Regulat ing Satell ite Dish Antennas, 
American Planning Association, Planning 
Advisory Service Report No. 394, and the 
discussion accompanying the release of the 
FCC Order at 51 Fed.Reg. 5519 (1986) et 
Nineteen sate l l i tes in geostationary orbit 
22,300 miles above the equator broadcast 
programming serv ices that can be received 
only by TVRO antennas . These "television 
satellites" are located above the eastern 
Pacific and are .spaced four degrees apart 
from each other. The TVRO remains in a 
fixed poflition to receive signals from a 
given satellite but is mounted on an electric 
rotor that permits it to be realigned to 
receive signals from the other satellites as 
required. 
In order for the TVRO antenna to re-
ceive satellite s igna l s , there must be a clear 
line of sight b e t w e e n the satellite and the 
dish antenna. Dense obstructions such as 
buildings, trees and shrubbery interfere 
with or prohibit reception. The range of 
unobstructed posit ions an antenna must 
have to "view" the satell ites and receive 
signals is called a "reception window" or 
"look angle". This angle is expressed in 
terms of two dimensions. The azimuth 
alignment, expres sed in degrees from true 
North, refers to the horizontal direction the 
antenna must be directed. Since there are 
a number of television satellites, this ts 
expressed as a range . The elevation align-
ment refers to the vertical orientation, 
usually expressed in degrees above the ho-
rizon. In northern N e w Jersey, a look 
angle with an azimuth alignment of 69 to 
143 degrees West and an elevation align-
ment of 14 d e g r e e s above the horizon is 
required to receive s ignals from the tele-
vision satel l i tes . 
Because satell ite-transmitted television 
s ignals are relatively weak, the dish anten-
nas must be at least ten feet in length in 
this area of the country in order to receive 
transmissions. 
[12] Plaintiffs do not claim that a rear-
lot installation would completely preclude 
ail satellite reception; they claim, rather, 
that they can receive "all" of the available 
s ignals only by mounting the dish antenna 
on the roof of their house. The FCC Order 
does not require the Ordinance to permit 
optimal placement; it precludes only "un-
reasonable" interference with satell ite sig-
nal reception. It is unclear whether plain-
tiffs inability to receive "ail" of the satel-
lite s ignals includes channels which are en-
crypted or which the plaintiffs are not oth-
erwise authorized to receive. Construing 
ail facts in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment, I can-
not conclude, on the basis of this assertion 
alone, that the regulation imposes an un-
reasonable burden on plaintiffs. 
It is clear, however , that the Ordinance 
functions as an unreasonable burden on 
reception because its provisions make re-
ception technically impossible and because 
it is general ly insensitive Lo the unique 
conditions that govern signal reception on 
any given site. 
Although defendant does not dispute 
that a ten-foot wide dish antenna is the 
smallest size capable of receiving television 
satellite reception in this area, the Ordi-
nance makes reception technically impossi-
ble by limiting the maximum height of any 
part of the antenna installation to six feet. 
A ten-foot wide dish antenna angled at the 
required fourteen degree elevation, would 
clearly exceed this limitation. 
The Ordinance is also insensitive to the 
unique conditions that govern reception on 
any given lot, The Ordinance requires the 
antenna to be "screened from view from 
adjoining properties and streets by ever-
IC 
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green planting . . . at least six feet in 
height at the time of planting." Ordinance 
sec. 3.1. This standard is unreasonable 
because it is insensitive to the impact of 
shielding on an antenna's recepuon win-
dow. While vegetation surrounding a sat-
ellite installation can actually help improve 
reception by absorbing interfering signals, 
it can impair or limit reception if it ob-
structs the antenna's line of sight. If the 
orientation of a specific lot requires a look 
angle directed toward a rear-adjoining lot, 
for example, the antenna would have to be 
placed over ten feet behind the required 
six-foot high evergreen screening, assum-
ing a fourteen degree elevation azimuth, in 
order to gain a clear "view" over the ob-
stacle. Given the configuration of some 
lots, this might well limit or completely 
prevent reception. This type of regulation 
was specifically disapproved by the FCC in 
the statements accompanying its Order. 
51 Fcd.Reg. 5519, 5524 (1986) ("(An ordi-
nance] cannot unreasonably limit or pre-
vent reception by requiring, for example, 
that a receive-only antenna be screened so 
that line of sight is obscured."). 
In addition, if there were lots on either 
aide of the roar yard, the TVRO user would 
also have to shield the antenna from view 
by the adjoining properties by planting 
evergreen shielding on both sides. Thus, a 
homeowner might have to plant thirty fet?t 
of hedgerows six feet tall to comply with 
the ordinance at a cost that could easily 
exceed the initial investment in satellite 
television reception equipment. 
The Ordinance also unreasonably re-
stricts reception by failing to provide op-
tions for alternative placement to TVRO 
users who cannot receive signals or who 
would receive only diminished recepuon 
through rear lot installation. While roof-
mounting poses obvious aesthetic and safe-
ty problems, a per se prohibition of roof 
installations, especially where the commu-
nity interests in appearance and safety can 
be satisfied at least in part, is an unreason-
able limitation on reception within the 
meaning of the Order. 
(131 Defendant's proposed solution to 
the antenna height limitation, which it con-
HIP OF MAPLEWOOD 1 0 3 1 
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cedes to be an unreasonable limitation of 
reception, is to allow TVRO users who can-
not achieve recepuon within the constraints 
imposed by the Ordinance to apply to the 
Board of Adjustment for a zoning variance. 
(This would presumably also be its re-
sponse to the other unreasonable limita-
tions I have found the statute imposes 
upon recepuon). The defendant claims that 
this scheme would effectively enable the 
Board to apply the Ordinance in an individ-
ualized manner. 
This scheme is unsatisfactory for several 
reasons. First, while the concept of indi-' 
vidualized treatment may be a worthy one, 
variances from this Ordinance do not pro-
vide an effective means of achieving this 
objective. 'A variance from a zoning ordi-
nance is permitted only if "without sub-
stantial detriment to the public good" and 
if it "will not substantially impair the in-
tent and the purpose of the zone plan and 
zoning ordinance." NJ.S.A. sec. 40:55D-
70. Apart from the very real question of 
whether any variance from the challenged 
Ordinance would remain consistent with its 
specific purposes, this scheme is objecuona-
ble because it does not include reasonable 
satellite television signal reception as a 
factor in the evaluation but considers uniy 
the purposes of the ordinance and the 
"public good". 
Second, permitting the Board effectively 
to regulate TVRO antenna placement by 
Kranung variances from an invalidated or-
dinance would allow the Board to exercise 
authority without bounds. No standards 
for antenna placement would exist to guide 
the decisions of the Board, to apprise 
TVRO users of permitted placement sites, 
or to provide a meaningful standard for 
review of the Board's decisions. Nor could 
the Board be guided directly by the FCC 
Order since it was intended as a standard 
for the preemption of local regulation, not 
a model zoning ordinance. Permitting the 
Board to regulate TVRO use in this man-
ner would also increase the likelihood of 
judicial intervention in a traditionally local 
function, something that I would think that 
the defendant would be loathe to encour-
age. 
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Finally, the variance procedure, requir-
ing TVRO antenna users to make an appli-
cation for hearing, publish notice, serve 
notice of publication and make a presenta-
tion at a public meeting, imposes burdens 
other antenna users are not required to 
bear and is therefore discriminatory within 
the meaning of the Order. Since the pro-
cess is not governed by consistent, objec-
tive standards, this variance process would 
represent an unreasonable limitation on re-
ception. 
I am not unsympathetic to the difficult 
task faced by municipalities that seek to 
regulate dish antenna use in balancing the 
community's aesthetic and safety interests 
with the individual's interest in receiving 
information transmitted through satellite 
television signals The FCC, however, has 
determined that when the community and 
individual interests conflict in this context, 
the interests of the individual and the na-
tional interest require that the balance be 
tipped in favor of permitting individual sat-
ellite television reception The task of 
^Uiiiionmg appropriate legislation in light 
of this mandate is not a simple one, but 
municipalities can enact regulation consist-
ent with the Order by regulating the use of 
all antennas evenhandedly, without impos-
ing special burdens on TVRO dish antenna 
users, or by ensuring that their regulations 
do not make reception technically impossi-
ble and are flexible enough to account for 
the unique reception requirements of the 
individual lots within their boundaries 
Conclusion 
For the reasons above. 1 conclude that, 
assuming that the FCC had authority to 
issue the Order, the Maplewood Ordinance 
is preempted by 47 CFR 25.201. I thus 
need not reach plaintiffs' constitutional 
claimso 
If the FCC Order is valid plaintiffs would 
be entitled to summary judgment declaring 
the Ordinance invalid, enjoining its enforce-
ment and awarding plaintiffs attorney's 
fees pursuant to 42 U S C sec. 1988 It 
would follow that defendant's motion to 
dismiss the preemption claim and for fail-
ure to spply for a variance should be de-
nied on the merits and that defendant's 
motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 should be 
dismissed as moot. 
However, defendant challenges the valid-
ity of the FCC Order, an issue I do not 
have jurisdiction to decide. If within 45 
days of October 11, 1988 defendant com-
mences a proceeding challenging the Order 
before the FCC and thereafter actively 
prosecutes the proceeding, and if defendant 
stays prosecution of plaintiffs and enforce-
ment of the Ordinance against them, I shall 
defer entering summary judgment against 
defendant at this time and shall stay pro-
ceedings in this case until final disposition 
of the proceeding challenging the validity 
of the FCC Order Otherwise summary 
judgment will be entered as described 
above Defendant should advise me by 
October 31, 1988 what course of action it 
proposes to take. 
APPENDIX 
MAPLEWOOD DISH ANTENNAE 
ZONING ORDINANCE 
There is hereby adopted an ordinance regu-
lating the construction, placement, and use 
of dish antennae within the Township of 
Maplewood and supplementing and amend-
ing the zoning ordinance of the Township 
of Maplewood regarding Accessory Build-
ing and Structures. 
SECTION 1 ACCESSORY BUILDINGS 
AND STRUCTURES 
Section 1 1 An accessory building attached 
to a principal building is considered part 
of the principal building and shall adhere 
to the yard requirements for the princi-
pal building. 
Section 1.2: The distance from an accesso-
ry building to a principal building shall 
not be less than 10 feet nor less than 6 
feet from another accessory building or a 
property line. 
Section 1 3: The distance from an accesso-
ry building to a side property line shall 
not be less than the side yard require-
ments of the principal budding. 
SECTION 2 DISH ANTENNAE 
Section 2 1. A receiving dish antennae (or 
satellite receiving station) shall be con-
sidered an accessory structure. 
i£ 
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Section 2.2: A receiving diah antennae 
shall be no more than 6 feet in height 
measured at the highest point of its out-
er circumference or any extension, in-
cluding the supporting structure. It 
shall be located in the rear yard only. 
On corner lota, which have no defined 
rear yard, it shall be located in a side 
yard a minimum of two times the re-
quired front setback from the street line 
measured at its closest point on its cir-
cumference, at any extension or to its 
supporting structure, * whichever is clos-
est. 
Section 2.3: A transmitting dish antennae 
is not a permitted use. 
SECTION 3. BUFFERS FOR DTSH AN-
TENNAE 
Section 3.1 A dish antennae [sic] shall be 
screened from view from adjoining prop-
erties and streets by evergreen planting, 
which shall be at least six feet in height 
at the time of planting. 
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ELI LILLY AND COMPANY. PUintifT. 
v. 
MEDTRONIC. INC.. Defendant. 
Civ. A. No. 83-5393. 
United States District Court, 
E.D. Pennsylvania. 
April 21, 1988. 
Owner of patents disclosing ventricu-
lar defibrillation devices brought infringe-
ment action. On issue of whether patents 
were unenforceable for inequitable conduct 
before Patent and Trademark Office, the 
District Court, Ditter, J., held that alleged 
infringer failed to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that inventors or their 
counsel were guilty of any intentional or 
I. Or. Michel Mirowski Is the inventor of the 757 
patent. Dr. Mirowski, Dr. Morton Mower, and 
AA 
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even grossly negligent withholding of any 
material information from PTO. 
Judgment for plaintiff. 
Patent* «=»312(6) 
Alleged infringer failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that inven-
tors or their counsel were guilty of any 
intentional or even grossly negligent with-
holding of any material information before 
Patent and Trademark Office during prose-
cution or reexamination of patents disclos-
ing ventricular defibrillation devices and, 
thus, patents were not invalid for ineq-
uitable conduct before PTO. 
Timothy J. Malloy, Lawrence M. Janns, 
Gregory J. Vogier, Chicago, III.. Richard G. 
Schneider, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff. 
Philip S. JohnHon, Albert W. Preston, 
John J. Mackicwicz, Gary H. Levin, Phila-
delphia, Pa., for defendant. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
DITTER, District Judge. 
Plaintiff Eli Lilly and Company brought 
this suit against defendant Medtronic, Inc. 
alleging infringement by Medtronic of two 
United States patents. No. Re. 27,757, reex-
amined and issued as Bl Re. 27,757 (the 757 
patent) and No. 3.942.536, reexamined and 
issued as Bl 3.1)42,536 (the 536 patent). At 
the close of Medtronic's ca*e, with the 
agreement of the parties. I granted Lilly's 
motion for a directed verdict with regard to 
the validity of the 536 patent and its in-
fringement by Medtronic's Model 7210 and 
its associated leads. The jury subsequent-
ly returned a verdict in favor of Lilly, hav-
ing found Medtronic's devices to infringe 
the claims of the 757 patent. The jury also 
decided that Medtronic's infringement of 
the 757 and 536 patents was willful. The 
parties agreed to submit for my determina-
tion the iaaue aa to whether the alleged 
inequitable conduct of the patents' inven-
tors,1 Dr. Michel Mirowski and Dr. Morton 
Rollin H. Dennison, a Medtronic engineer, axe 
listed a* the inventor* of the 536 patent. 
if 
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LAWRENCE REY TOPHAM 
423 7th Avenue A}
 n , / _ 
Salt Lake City, Utah (-4>PJ *F Lifrn&Z. 
April 14, 1989 IJT*A(0 fi/rZsv&ZGD 
State of Utah "7Z? J£Pf&iy D- JO//A/SCK 
Department of Administrative Services
 /rn , /U?,?,, /u <GC>Q 
Utah State Archives and Records Service ^/v ^r/<^ '7 / /ZT7 
Archives Building State Capitol /If I?<l//0 £ /*/ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 OT^ A**'!* 
MR. Jeffery 0. Johnson: 
When I was at the research center on April 10, 1989, I informed 
you that I could not find the Oath of Office Certificates for 
Norman H. Banger ter, W. Val Oveson, R. Paul Van Dam, Tom L. 
Allen and Edward T. Alter for 1989. I also informed you that 
I could not find in the same file any of the Oath of Office 
Certificates for any of the members of the 1989 Utah Legislature. 
I reported the absence of those records to Kathy Pickering who 
spoke to Gordon R. Hall and Mr. Butler about their not being 
on file at the Archives, I also reported it to David Hansen, 
KSLf KTVX, Associated Press, The Deseret News, and the Sheriff's 
office the same afternoon I met with you, Val Wilson and 
Christie. 
As you suggested I am writing you for a written response to 
this serious matter. Utah law provides that the Oath of Office 
Vshall be filed in the Department of Archives. Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as Amended7~(^&=£r-^y says that all state officers 
shall file their oath^of office in the Department of Archives. 
F; Utah Code Anno tat edJjS4—£-^) requires that to be done within sixty 
ft J days or the office shall be declared vacant. 
s I was informed by Mr. Val Wilson at the research center that 
the oaths of office not on file on April 10, 1989 in the Depart-
ment of Archives for the five executive officers named above 
were delivered to the Archives Department on April 11, 1989. 
Christie told me that she received a hand full of Oath of Office 
Certificates from a man she did not know on Tuesday, April 11, 
1989, and that among them were the ones for Governor and Lt. 
Governor among others she was unable to verify when I talked 
to her on the morning of Wednesday, April 12, 1989. 
Under provisions of the Utah Criminal Code it is unlawful to 
act in any public office without filing the required oath of 
office. Utah Code Annotated 76-8-203 states the nature of the 
offense. I would ask you to verify immediately in writing the 
time, date and place those five Oath of Office Certificates 
were filed and by whom they were delivered and received. A 
Court document was filed on April 12, 1989 concerning the failure 
to file the oaths of office for the five state executive 
officers, your verification is needed. I would also ask you 
to verify the presence or absence of the oaths of office certifi-
cates for the members of the Utah Legislature and the time, 
date and place of filing, and by whom delivered and by whom 
received. 
^LC^L* »C£^/}^^-xJatzA3''l' 
EXHIBIT "CC-1" Lawrence Rey Topham 
Is the state's 
top officeholder 
really official? 
Gov. Norm Bangerter S M P » 9 * B 1 
Elected officials 
aren't official, 
activist says 
B1 By Jay Evensen Deseret News staff writer 
Just when state officials were getting used 
to the jobs they were elected to last year, 
along comes an activist who tells them they 
really aren't in office. 
Lawrence Topham, a constitutionalist who 
once paid a candidate filing fee with silver 
dollars worth far more than their face value, 
says every state officeholder in Utah has bro-
ken the law by failing to file an oath of office 
with the State Archives Division. 
Topham, who once ran for governor as an 
American Party candidate but was ousted 
from that party after an internal dispute last 
year, is linking that law with another one re-
quiring elected officials to qualify for their 
offices within 60 days of the start of their 
terms. 
In letters delivered to state officials this 
week, he says every elected official, including 
the governor, is no longer in office. 
Please see TOPHAM on B6 
Saturday, April 15,1989 
TOPHAM 
Continued from B1 
State officials acted puzzled Fri-
day when confronted with the 
claims. 
"The governor took the oath of of-
fice in January . . . Remember?" said 
Bud Scruggs, chief of staff to Gov. 
Norm Bangerter. 
Jeffery Johnson, state archives di-
rector, said he believes the law re-
quires oaths of office to be filed only 
for historical purposes. That law 
does not include a time limit, he said. 
But, since Topham began his cru-
sade last week, all the oaths of office 
from January have been placed on 
file, Johnson said. 
Meanwhile, state officials say the 
public should rest assured that gov-
ernment is functioning normally and 
that the results of November's elec-
tion still stand. 
"We have a video tape of the 
swearing-in ceremony; the best proof 
you-could have/1 said Lt. Gov. Val 
Oveson. 
XI 
EXHIBIT "CC-2M 
TVIS l S To @o/i£d=ZT T?y£ BUtto^S t'/O Ttfc 
L&T7&L X Li=TT CuiTH Yoo a^ TnZi j)/9y HOJOUI'JUG* 
b&==D S^^f-x /fad S£-A-f hlcrr St-\-2.faJ> 
OPT1C1AL OATHS AND BOND8 52-1-4 
52-1-2. Bonds to state — Approval and recording — Filing 
of oaths. 
Whenever state officers, officials of state institutions, or other persons, are 
required to give official bonds to the state, the bonds, unless otherwise pro-
vided, shall be approved by the Division of Finance, and recorded by the state 
treasurer in a book kept for that purpose. The oaths of office of all state 
officials shall be filed with the Division of Archives. 
CHAPTER 2 
FAILURE TO QUALIFY FOR OFFICE 
Section 
62-2-L Tin* in which to qualify — Failure 
— Office declined vacant 
52-2-1* Time in which to qualify — Failure — Office de-
clared vacant 
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to any office of the state or 
any of its political subdivisions, tails to qualify for such office within sixty 
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for which he was elected 
or appointed, such office shall thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as 
provided by law. Whenever the bond of any officer of the state or of any of its 
political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise becomes 
void or of no effect, without another proper bond being given so that contin-
uance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of such officer shall there-
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EXHIBIT "CC-3" 2 2— 
PART 2 
ABUSE OF OFFICE 
Section 
76-3-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized 
acts or failure of duty. 
76-8-202. Official misconduct — Unlawful acts 
based on "inside'* information. 
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct. 
76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized 
acta or failure of duty. 
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
if, with an intent to benefit himself or another or to 
harm another, he knowingly commits an unautho-
rized act which purport* to be an act of his office, or 
knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed 
on him by law or dearly inherent in the nature of his 
office.
 t973 
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct. 
(1) A person is guilty of unofficial misconduct if he 
exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions 
of a public office when: 
(a) He has not taken and filed the required 
oath of office; or 
(b) He has failed to execute and file the re-
quired bond; or 
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to of-
fice; or 
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his of-
fice after his term has expired and the successor 
has been elected or appointed and has qualified, 
or alter (lis office has been legally removed. 
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his 
successor in office or other person entitled to the 
official seal or any records, papers, documents, or 
other writings appertaining or belonging to his 
office or mutilates or destroys or takes away the 
same. 
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misde-
meanor. EXHIBIT "CC-4" /2.3 lf7S 
Norman H, Bangerter 
Governor 
Jeffery 0 Johnson 
Director 
I State of Utah 
Department of Administrative Services 
Division of Archives & Records Service 
State Capitol Archives Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801)538-3012 
April 17, 1989 
Lawrence Rey Topham 
423 7th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Dear Mr. Topham: 
In answer to your letter of April 14, the State Archives received the Oath of 
Off tee Certificates for Tom L. Allen, State Auditor; Edward T. Alter, State 
Treasure; R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General; W. Val Oveson, Lt. Governor; and 
Norrnan H. Bangerter, Governor on April 11. They are all dated January 2, 1989 
and signed by Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme Court. We 
have not received the Oaths from the 1989 Legislature. 
If We can be of further service to you, please let us know. 
Sincerely, 
o 
y 0. Johnson 
Cc David D. Hansen, Lt. Governor's Office 
c. Kirk Waldron 
EXHIBIT "CC-5" 
z<f 
18 § 1366 CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2 
laftaUri** Htatary. For W-piiitirt bluory and 
fmrpom at ISe U 91-47). « 19*4 U 5 Code 
COM tiid Adm N<v% a. 3111 Sex, aJno, N h L 
99~M* 1114 U.1 Code Co«s and Adnt Mew* 
p. H39. 
Laajaaladrt Hlntory. For lefulativt kiaxory tad 
pnrnoac 0/ Nb.L 9*-50*. « 1916 U.1 Code 
Coat tad Adra. New* p. 3535. 
M n l Jnry frardea and tnntmrtona 
Eaacndai ckxncata of ofTenac, ant | 1304 and 
Nocca thereunder. 
U t I r k v CMMttirki 
Tbc Fun KmmAmcni and osaliury trumiU* 
bom l o b C Crudes and CAJVOI Ledem. Dr-
ift* CoJLLRrr. 143 (19U). 
Hatae nf Dncbiona 
iTenjaV md mfndtmcr n/ rridtmcr Jl 
L Ca—Hfirli — tHy 
FVw Ajncnriment d*j not protect defcacUnt 
front exxmctioa under It US CA- f 1342 vh*b 
probibioj reentry apon milrury tmtaHauon after 
bckf ordered not to enter, wbert defendant, vbo 
bad received bur kner. entered eTrtary land, 
denpini fence, aifnt and *«rb*J vmr&nxp tot lo 
enter. U l *. WaJah, 0 . 9 (Am.) I9t3, T70 
FJdl+HL 
Evidence wnt wufftcxBi to aupvoct fcocfirvt liv*t 
defendant Inew lia entr? fento KuLtmrv bvULfUm 
Library aWnrencna 
Consumer Frotactioe a»30. 
CJX Trade-Marka, Trndt-Nnmca and Unfair 
Cooipctiuon | | 237. 231. 
of attdenr aamaik 1711cm. U i v. Dorrcfl. CA.9 
(Cat) 1913. 731 F-2d 427. 
TWf aaction prokibidaf tint foug upon any 
anbury reacrvation far toy pnrpoa* pronibitad by 
lav require* that the initial entry be mad* far a 
prohibited purpoae; that pronibitad pnrpoat nay 
be the unauthorixnd entry faaeJf; foiaf upon a 
anOitary baac witb kjaowladnt that aucb entry ia 
nmrtnorund nooum tkia aactaom. U-l v. HaO, 
GAAriiJ9M. 742 F^d 1133 
7. ferine* arwnJnhad by law 
Cor&mander'i reatnetion of entry under lawful 
actbority waa aufftocnt to aantt ^prooibitad by 
lav* requirement of often** of unlawful entry into 
vulitary mttaflaftonu d defendant knew bai entry 
wia BMutbortxnd U-l v. Cofbnr, CA.9 (Xlont) 
1913. 739 FJd 76a 
Defendant1! notms far entering mnon aallttary 
faaataJQaoon art irnktmnt ia proaccubon far men-
try of mibtaLry nuranation after bcinf rune»td or 
ordemd to not immtw Vf orwnannnrlmf ofTkaer. 
UJ. v. Bcnmi. D.CN.Y.19U, &Q FJKnptx »7 . 
SLUT** m*kjuf it nninwfni to reenter a aaiktary 
baae arVr hana* bacn bnrrtd W tna rrnamaniliiii 
I lit!, laterfertftct with the opermUo-ti 0/ a aatelllU 
(a) Whoerer, without the tuthority of the aaUllite operator, bUntionaily or 
maliooualy Interferes with the authorued operation of a commonicationa or weather 
aatelliU or obetructi or hinder* any aateUite tranamitakm ahall be fined in accord-
ance with thk title or impruorved not more than ten y *an or both. 
(b) Thia tection does not prohibit any lawfully authorued inTeatigatiYe, protective, 
or mtelbf ence activity of 1 law enforcement agency or of an intelligence agency of 
the United State*. 
(Addad P*b,L »«0€ , TWt III. | 303(a). Ocl. H, int. 100 Sut 1871) 
CHAPTER 67—MILITARY AND NAVY 
I 13S2. Entering military. naraJ, or C**«t Guard property 
3^" 
Pad 25 47 CFR Ch. I (10-1-37 Edition) 
plaints regarding violations of equal 
employment provisions of Federal, 
State, Territorial, or local law shall 
maintain for public Inspection, in the 
same manner and in the same loca-
tions as required for the keeping and 
posting of tariffs as set forth in 5 61.72 
of this chapter, a file containing a 
copy of each such report and copies of 
all exhibits, letters, and other docu-
ments filed as part thereto, all corre-
spondence between the permittee or li-
censee and the Commission pertaining 
to the reports after they have been 
filed and all documents incorporated 
therein by reference. 
(ii) Period of retention. The docu-
ments specified in paragraph (f)(2)(i) 
of this section shall be maintained for 
a period of 2 years. 
[35 FR 12894, Aug. 14, 1970, as amended at 
36 FR 3119. Feb. 18. 1971. Redesignated at 
38 FR 22481, Aug. 21. 19731 
PART 25—SATELLITE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Subpart A—General 
Sec. 
25.101 Basis and scope. 
25.102 [Reserved] 
25.103 Definitions. 
25.104 Preemption of local zoning of earth 
stations. 
Subpart i—Communication• Satellite 
Procurement Regulations [Reserved] 
Subpart C— Technical Standards 
25 201 Definitions. 
25 202 Frequencies, frequency tolerance 
and emission limitations. 
25 203 Choice of sites and frequencies. 
25.204 Power limits. 
25.205 Minimum angle of antenna eleva-
tion, 
25.206 8tatlon Identification. 
25 207 Cessation of emissions. 
25.208 Power flux density limits. 
25 209 Antenna performance standards. 
25.251 Special requirements for coordina-
tion. 
25.252 Maximum permissible Interference 
power. 
25.253 Determination of coordination dis-
tance for near great circle propagation 
mechanisms. 
Sec 
25 254 Computation of coordination dis-
tance contours for propagation modes 
associated with precipitation scatter. 
25.255 Guidelines for performing interfer-
ence analyses for near great circle prop-
agation mechanisms. 
25.256 Guidelines for performing interfer-
ence analyses for precipitation scatter 
modes [Reserved] 
Subpart D—[Reserved] 
Subpart E—Applications and Authorizations 
25 390 Developmental operation. 
25.391 Qualifications of domestic satellite 
space station licensees 
25.392 Licensing provisions for the radlode-
termlnation satellite service. 
Subparts F-O—(Reserved] 
Subpart H—Autnorfzation To Own Stock in the 
Communications Satellite Corporation 
25 501 Scope of this subpart. 
25 502 Definitions 
25 503-25 504 (Reserved] 
25 505 Persons requiring authorization. 
25 506-25 514 (Reserved] 
25 515 Method of securing authorization. 
25 516-25 519 (Reserved] 
25 520 Contents of application. 
25 521 Who may sign applications. 
25 522 Full disclosures 
25 523 Form of application, number of 
copies, fees, etc. 
25 524 (Reserved] 
25.525 Action upon applications. 
25 526 Amendments. 
25 527 Defective applications. 
25 528-25 529 (Reserved] 
25 530 Scope of authorization. 
25 531 Revocation of authorization. 
EDITORIAL NOT* At 39 FR 33527, Sept 18. 
1974. 'Earth Station" was corrected to read 
"earth station" wherever It appeared in the 
part. 
Subpart A—General 
AUTHORITY* Sees 101-404. 76 Stat. 419-
427; 47 U S C. 701-744. 
9 25.101 Basis and scope. 
(a) The rules and regulations In this 
part are issued pursuant to the au-
thority contained in section 201(c)( l l ) 
of the Communications Satellite Act 
of 1962. 
(b) The rules and regulations In this 
psirt supplement, and are In addition 
to the rules and regulations contained 
^ 
Federal Communications Commission § 25.104 
In or to be added to, other parts of this 
chapter currently in force, or which 
may subsequently be promulgated, 
and which are applicable to matters 
relating to communications by satel-
lites. 
[28 FR 13037, Dec. 5. 1963] 
§25.102 [Reserved] 
§25.103 Definitions. 
(a) Communications common carri-
er. The term "communications 
common carrier" as used in this part 
means any person (individual, partner-
ship, association, joint-stock company, 
trust, corporation, or other entity) en-
gaged as a common carrier for hire, in 
interstate or fcrcisr^ communication 
by wire or radio or in interstate or for-
eign radio transmission of energy, in-
cluding such carriers as are described 
In subsection 2(b) (2) and (3) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, tod, in addition, for pur-
poses of Subpart H of this part, in-
cludes any individual, partnership, as-
sociation, joint-stock company, trust. 
corporation, or other entity which 
owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 
or is under direct or indirect common 
control with, any such carrier. 
(b) Authorized earner. (1) Except as 
piovided in paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section, the term "authorized carrier" 
means a communications common car-
rier which is authorized by the Feder-
al Communications Commission under 
the Communications Act of 1934, as 
amended, to provide sen-ices by means 
of communications satellites. 
(2) For the purposes of Subpart H of 
this part, the term "authorized carri-
er" means a communications common 
carrier which is specifically authorized 
or which is a member of a class of car-
riers authorized by the Commission to 
own shares of stock in the corporation. 
(c) Communications satellite corpo-
ration. (1) The terms "communica-
tions satellite corporation" or "corpo-
ration" as used in this part mean the 
corporation created pursuant to the 
provisions of Title III of the Commu-
nications Satellite Act of 1962. 
(2) The corporation shall be deemed 
to be a common carrier within the 
meaning of section 3(h) of the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962. 
(d) Communication-satellite earth 
station complex. The term corrmuni-
cation-satellite earth station romplex 
includes transmitters, receiver*, and 
communications antennas at the earth 
station site together with the intercon-
necting terrestrial facilities tables , 
lines, or microwave facilitiss) and mod-
ulating and demodulating eqnoment 
necessary for processing of traffic re-
ceived from the terrestrial distribution 
system(s) prior to transmission \ia sat-
ellite and of traffic received from the 
satellite prior to transfer of channels 
of communication to terrestrial distri-
bution system(s). 
(e) Communication-satellite earth 
station complex functions. The com-
munication-satellite earth station com-
plex interconnects with terminal 
equipment of common carriers or au-
thorized entities at the Interfax: ac-
cepts traffic from such entities at the 
interface, processes for transmission 
via satellite and performs the trans-
mission function; receives traffic from 
a satellite or satellites, processes it in a 
form necessary to deliver channels of 
communication to terrestrial comiron 
carriers or such other authorized enti-
ties and delivers the processed traffic 
to such entities at the interface 
(f) Interface. The point of intercon-
nection between two distinct but adja-
cent commu' ^ t ions systems having 
different functions. The interface in 
the communication-satellite sen ice is 
that point where communications ter-
minal equipment of the ter rrstrial 
common carriers or other authorized 
entities interconnects with the termi-
nal equipment of the communication-
satellite earth station complex The 
interface in the communication satel-
lite service shall be located at the 
earth station site, or if this is impracti-
cable, as close thereto as po^siblr 
(Sees. 4, 201. 303. 48 Stat. 1066. as amended. 
76 Stat. 419. 48 Stat. 1082. as amended. 47 
US.C. 154. 721. 303) 
(28 FR 13037, Dec. 5. 1963. as a m e n d e at 31 
FR 3289. Mar. 2. 1966] 
§25.104 Preemption of local zoning of 
earth stations. 
State and local zoning or other regu-
lations that differentiate between sat-
ellite receive-only antennas and other 
213 
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§25.201 47 CFR Ch. I (10-1-87 Edition) 
types of antenna facilities are pre-
empted unless such regulations: 
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly de-
fined health, safety or aesthetic objec-
tive: and 
(b) Do not operate to Impose unrea-
sonable limitations on, or prevent, re-
ception of satellite delivered signals by 
receive-only antennas or to Impose 
costs on the users of such antennas 
that are excessive In light of the pur-
chase and installation cost of the 
equipment. 
Regulation of satellite transmitting 
antennas is preempted In the same 
manner except that state and local 
health and safety regulation is not 
preempted. # 
C51 FR 5526, Feb. 14, 1988] 
Subpart B— Communications Satolllt* 
Procurement Regulations [Reserved] 
Subpart C—Technical Standards 
e 
AUTHORITY: Sec. 4, 48 Stat. 1066, as 
amended; 47 U.S.C. 154. Interprets or ap-
plies sec. 303, 48 Stat. 1082, as amended; 47 
U.S.C. 303. 
Soulier 30 FR 7176, May 28, 1965. as 
amended at 36 FR 2562. Feb.. 8, 1971, unless 
otherwise noted. 
925.201 Definitions. 
Active satellite. An earth satellite 
carrying a station Intended to transmit 
or re-transmit radlocommunication 
signals. 
Coordination distance. For the pur-
poses of this part, the expression "co-
ordination distance" means the dis-
tance from an earth station, within 
which there Is a possibility of the use 
of a given transmitting frequency at 
this earth station causing harmful In-
terference to stations In the fixed or 
mobile service, sharing the same band, 
or of the use of a given frequency for 
reception at this earth station receiv-
ing harmful Interference from such 
stations In the fixed or mobile service. 
Earth station. A station located 
either on the Earth's surface or within 
the major portion of the Earth's at-
mosphere Intended for communica-
tion: 
(a) With one or more space stations; 
or 
(b) With one or more stations of the 
same kind by means of one or more re-
flecting satellites or other objects In 
space. 
Fixed earth station. An earth station 
intended to be used at a specified fixed 
point 
Fixed-satellite service. A radlocom-
munication service between Earth sta-
tions at specified fixed points when 
one or more satellites are used; In 
some cases this service includes satel-
lite-to-satellite links, which may also 
be effected in the inter-satellite serv-
ice: the fixed-satellite service may also 
Include feeder links for other space ra-
dlocommunication services. 
Geostationary satellite. A geosyn-
chronous satellite whose circular and 
direct orbit lies In the plane of the 
Earth's equator and which thus re-
mains fixed relative to the Earth: by 
extension, a satellite which remains 
approximately fixed relative to the 
Earth. 
Inter-Satellite Service. A radlocom-
munication service providing links be-
tween artificial earth satellites. 
Mobile earth station. An earth sta-
tion Intended to be used while In 
motion or during halts at unspecified 
points. 
Passive satellite. An earth satellite 
Intended to transmit radio communi-
cation signals by reflection. 
Radiodetermination Satellite Serv-
ice. A radlocommunication service for 
the purpose -of radiodeterminatlon In-
volving the use of one or more space 
stations. 
Satellite system. A space system 
using one or more artificial earth sat-
ellites. 
Spacecraft A man-made vehicle 
which Is intended to go beyond the 
major portion of the Earth's atmos-
phere. 
Space operation service. A radlocom-
munication service concerned exclu-
sively with the operation of space-
craft, in particular space tracking, 
space telemetry and space telecom-
mand. These functions will normally 
be provided within the service In 
which the space station Is operating. 
Space radiocommunication. Any ra-
dlocommunication Involving the use of 
one or more space stations or the use 
F5
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of one or more reflecting satellites or 
other objects in space. 
Space station, A station located on 
an object which is beyond, is intended 
to go beyond, or has been beyond, the 
major portion of the Earths atmos-
phere. 
Space system. Any group of cooper-
ating earth stations and/or space sta-
tions employing space radiocommuni-
cation for specific purposes. 
Space telecommand The use of ra-
diocommunication for the transmis-
sion of signals to a space station to ini-
tiate, modify or terminate function of 
the equipment on a space object, in-
cluding the space station. 
Space telemetering. The use of tele-
metering for the transmission from a 
space station of results of measure-
ments made in a spacecraft, including 
those relating to the functioning of 
the spacecraft. 
Space tracking. Hetermination of 
the orbit, velocity or instantaneous po-
sition of an "object in space by means 
of radiodetermination, excluding pri-
mary radar, for the purpose of follow-
ing the movement of the object. 
Terrestrial radiocommunication. 
Any radiocommunication other than 
space radiocommunication or radio as-
tronomy. 
Terrestrial station. A station effect-
ing terrestrial radiocommunication. 
[30 FR 7176, May 28, 1965, as amended at 36 
FR 2562. Feb. 6, 1971; 48 FR 40254. Sept. 6. 
1983; 51 FR 18445, May 20, 1986] 
§ 25.202 \ Frequencies frequency tolerance 
and'emission limitations. 
(a)(1)Frequency bands. The follow-
ing frequencies are available for use 
by the fixed-satellite service. Precise 
frequencies and bandwidths of emis-
sion will be assigned on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Sp«c#-to-€irm 
37tXM200 MHi1 , 
10.95-11.2 GHlS 
11.45-11.7 GHz'i 
11.7-12.2 GHi 
17.7-197 GHx' 
19.7-20.0 GHz 
Etrttvto-*»c* 
5925-6425 MHt», 
14 0-14 5 GHz.», 
27S-29 5GHZ.', 
29 5-00 0 GHz. 
1
 TNt band m snamd coequafty wW> tarrwthtJ ndtoconv 
rnurication torvtcti. 
* Us* of th»s band by m« fhrad-saWWa MTAC* is '•fiad to 
international system ,^ . % other than <jom»stic *v«tarm 
rnesa bands are also snarad on a co-aoua< tn«-i w** 
•wmwtnal rad»ocornmur»'c.-!!>on services 
'The band 14.0-M3 GHz « sh«/ed coequalty * fh (he 
raoVxiav»gatton vrvx:** and the band U 4 - u « ''IWT * 
shared with Govemm^oi terTestnal rad*ocommun c^a• en »erv 
•ces »n acco^dsnc« with »he provrsions of footnote '..•':234 -n 
the TaWe o* Frequency Allocation 
(2) The following frequencies are 
available for use by the Radio<i«Her-
mination Satellite Service: 
1610-1626.5 MHz: Uscr-to-Satelllte Link 
2483.5-2500 MHz: Satelllte-to-ttw Link 
Fixed-Satellite service frequencies 
may be used for links between rad ode-
termination satellites and control cen-
ters, including the following sp»M ially 
allocated bands, subject to the Rules 
in this subpart: 
5117-5183.0 MHz: Satelltte-to-Control 
Center Link 
6525-6541.5 MHz: Control Center-tn-$atel-
lite Link 
(b) Other frequencies and associated 
bandwidths of emission may b<» as-
signed on a case-by-case basis to space 
systems under this part in conform-
ance with § 2.106 of this chapter and 
the Commission's rules and policies. 
(c) Applicants, permittees and licens-
ees of radio stations governed by this 
part shall provide the Comrvssion 
with all information it requires for the 
Advance Publication, coordination and 
notification of frequency assignments 
pursuant to the international Radio 
RegulPtions and Article XIV of the 
INTELSAT Agreement. This Informa-
tion includes, but is not limitrd to, 
that specified in Appendixes 3 and 4 of 
the Radio Renuiations (Geneva 1979). 
No protection from Interference 
caused by radio stations authorize by 
other Administrations is guaranteed 
unless coordination procedures are 
timely completed or, with respect to 
individual administrations, by success-
fully completing coordination agree-
ments. Any radio station authorization 
for which coordination has not been 
completed may be subject to addition-
al terms and conditions as required to 
effect coordination of the frequency 
assignments with other Administra-
tions. 
(d) Orbital locations assigned to 
space stations licensed under this part 
by the Commission are subject to 
change by summary order of the Com-
&f FS 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-4 
rejected written offer. Mcndelson v. Roland compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron 
(1926) 66 U 487, 243 P 798. (1917) 51 U 234,169 P 745. 
Surrender, release or discharge. 
Surrender of interest under contract for 
purchase of land could be properly effected 
without deed or conveyance in writing in 
Collateral References, 
Frauds, Statute of <£=> 71 et seq. 
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 90 et seq. 
72 AmJur 2d 616 et seq.. Statute of Frauds 
J 59 et seq. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In 
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement; 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within 
one year from the making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
another. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration 
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry, 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to 
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator 
or intestate out of his own estate. 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, 5 2467; L. 
1909, ch. 72, §1; C.L. 1917. §5817; R.S. 1933 
it C. 1943, 33-5-4. 
Compiler'! Note*. 
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws 
1876, §1014; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §5 2835. 
3918, 4219. 
Affirmative defense. 
When action is on contract, admitted by 
defendant, he must interpose special plea of 
statute if statute is to be available as 
defense. Abba v, Smyth (1899) 21 U 109, 59 
P756. 
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party 
relying upon it as a defense. M A S Constr. 
it Engineering Co. v Clearfield State Bank 
(1967) 19 U 2d 86, 426 P 2d 227 
Defendant, who answered by a general 
denial and simultaneous motion to dismiss 
plaintiff's claim as being barred under 
subset. (2) of this section, proceeded improp-
erly, since under Rule 12(b). Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a 
ground for motion to dismiss but rather an 
iffirmative defense under Rule 8<c). W. W & 
W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappaa (1970) 24 U 2d 
264, 470 P 2d 252. 
Alteration or modification of original con-
tract. 
If original contract, to be binding and 
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of 
frauds, is required to be in writing and sub-
scribed by parties sought to be charged, then 
a subsequent agreement altering or modify-
ing any of ita material parts or terms is also 
required to be in writing and so subscribed, 
no part performance or anything done by 
such party in reliance on the subsequent 
agreement being alleged or proved, especially 
if interest in land is involved. Combined Met-
als, Inc. v. Bastian (1928) 71 U 535, 267 P 
1020, distinguished in 100 U 516, 116 P 2d 
578. 
Parties may modify orally an agreement in 
writing where the original contract is not 
required by statute of frauds to be in writing, 
at least where there is consideration for such 
modification. But a contract required by stat-
ute of frauds to be in writing cannot be mod-
ified by a subsequent oral agreement, 
although this rule is subject to many excep-
tions, the first great division coming between 
executory and executed modifications. 
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc. 
(1935) 88 U 194, 48 P 2d 489, affirmed on 
rehearing 88 U 213. 53 P 2d 1153. 
An oral modification of a contract required 
to be in writing, when such modification "is 
fully executed, is taken out of the statute. In 
31 
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UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 61-1-1 
61-1-1. Fraud unlawful. 
It ia unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
History: C. 1953, 61-M, enacted by L» 
1963, ch. 145, { 1; L. 1963, ch, 284, I 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend* 
ment made minor changes in phraseology, 
punctuation and style. 
Compiler's Notes. — Sections 61-M to 
61-1-41 (L 1925, ch. 87, 55 1 to 10, 10x, 11 to 
18, 20 to 27; 1927, ch. 59, § I; 1929, ch. 79, * l ; 
R. S. 1933, 82-1-1 to 82-1-41; L. 1941 (1st S. S.), 
ch. 29, n 1, 2; C. 1943, 82-1-1 to 82-1-41; L. 
1957, en. 129, f 1; £9S£, en. 149, i £ J, refatin*; 
to the state securities commission, were re* 
pealed by Laws 1963, ch. 145,5 1 (see 61-1-30). 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and application. 
Intent to defraud 
Negligent preparation of financial statement. 
Private action. 
Purpose of act 
Security classification. 
Construction and application. 
In riew of the severe penalties and serious 
consequences imposed by the act for its viola-
tion, a particular transaction would not be held 
in violation thereof unless it clearly and satis-
factorily appeared to contravene the spirit and 
letter of the law. Penalties and forfeitures 
would not be implied or adjudged on doubtful 
ground*. The statute, being penah "a* to he 
strictly construed, end not extended by impli-
cation. Guaranty Mfg Co. v Wilcox, 62 Utah 
1S4, 218 P. 133 (1923), Miller v. Stuart, 69 
Utah 250, 253 P 900 (1927) 
Intent to defraud. 
A scheme to defraud need not come to frui-
tion in order to constitute a crime under this 
section; the offense 1* complete when a devic%, 
scheme or artifice is used with intent to de-
fraud. State v. Facer, 652 P.2d 110 (Utah 
1976). 
New H 6M-1 to 61-1-30 were enacted by f 1 
of the act 
Comparable Provision*. — Colo. Rev. 
Stat H 11-51-101 to 11-51-129. 
Idaho Code I 30-1401 et aeq. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. H 90.010 to 90.205. 
Wyo. Stat }* 17-4-101 to 17-4-129. 
Croas-Roferencea, — Criminal Code, corpo-
ration frauds, \ 76-10-701 et aeq. 
False or misleading statement! in filed docu-
ments unlawful, f 61-1-16. 
Representation that registration constitutes 
approval unlawful, h 61-1-17. 
Negligent preparation of ^nanrial state* 
moot. 
Lack of privity is not a defense where an 
accountant ta aware that his work will be 
relied on by parties who may extend credit to 
his client or assume his client's obligations; 
however, a future purchaser of stock of a corpo-
ration belongs to an unlimited claaa, and could 
not be reasonably foreseen aa a third party who 
would rely on a financial statement prepared 
by the accountant. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & 
Co., 529 P 2d 806 (Utah 1976). 
Private action. 
Although this statute makes certain prac-
tices unlawful, it does not provide for a right of 
private action for its violation. Milliner v. 
Elmer Fox k Co. 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1976). 
Purpose of act. 
The purpose of Utah's Blue Sky Law waa to 
prevent fraud in the sale of securities and to 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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76-10-1507 CRIMINAL CODE 158 
person in charge may cause the person so removed to 
be detained and delivered to the proper authorities 
l m 
7(5-10-1507. Exclusion of persons without bona 
fide business from terminpl — Fire-
arms and dangerous materials — Sur-
veillance devices and seizure of offend-
ing material* — Detention of violators 
— Private security per*onnrl. 
(1) In order to provide for the safety, welfare and 
comfort of passengers, a bus company may refuse ad-
mission to terminals to any person not having bona 
fide business within the terminal Any such refusal 
shall not be inconsistent or contrary to state or fed-
eral laws or regulations, or to any ordinance of the 
political subdivision in which the terminal is located. 
An authorized bus company representative may re-
quire any person in a terminal to identify himself and 
state his business. Failure to comply with such re-
quest or to state an acceptable business purpose shall 
be grounds for the representative to request that the 
person depart the terminal. Any person who refuses 
to comply with such a request shall be guilty of a 
class C misdemeanor. 
(2) Any person who carries a concealed dingerous 
weapon, firearm, or any explosive, highly inflamma-
ble or hazardous materials or device* into a terminal 
or aboard a bus shall be guilty of a third degree fel-
ony. The bus company may empfoy wxm&blc 
means, including mechanical, electronic or x-ray de-
vices to detect such items concealed in baggage or 
upon the person of any pa««enger. Upon th* discovery 
of any such item, the company may obtain poe**« i^on 
and retain custody thereof until it is ti*n*ferreii to 
law enforcement officers. 
(3) An authorized bus company representative may 
detain within a terminal or bus any person violating 
the provisions of this act for a reasonable time until 
law enforcement authorities arrive Such detention 
shall not constitute unlawful imprisonment and nei-
ther the bus company nor the representative shall be 
civilly or criminally liable upon ground* of unlawful 
imprisonment or assault, provided that only reason-
able and necessary force is exercised against any per-
son so detained. 
(4) A bus company may employ or contract for pri-
vate security personnel Such personnel may detain 
within a terminal or bus any person violating the 
provisions of this act for a reasonable time until law 
enforcement authorities arrive, and may use reason-
able and necessary force in subduing or detaining anv 
person violating this act. ifrt 
7&104508. Theft of baggage or cargo. 
Any person who removes any baggage, cargo or 
other item transported upon s bus or stored in a ter-
minal without consent of the owner of the property or 
the bus company, or its duly authorized representa-
tive is guilty of thefl and shall be punished pursuant 
to Section 76-6-412. i n 
?6-104509. Obstructing operation of bus. 
Any person who unlawfully obstructs or impedes by 
force or violence, or any means of intimidation, the 
regular operation of a bus is guilty of a cla** C misde-
meanor, i m 
76-10-1510. Obstructing operation of bus — 
Conspiracy. 
Two or more persons who willfulh or maliciousl} 
Combine or conspire to violate Section 76-10-1509 
Shall each be guilty of a class C misdemeanor \m 
76-10-1511. Cumulative and supplemental na-
ture of act 
The provisions of this act shall be cumulative and 
supplemental to the provisions of any other law of the 
state. it?* 
PART 18 
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES 
Section 
76-10-1601. 
76-10-1S02 
76-10-1603. 
76-10-1603.5. 
76-10-1604. 
76-10-1605. 
76-10-1606. 
76-10-1607. 
76-10-1608. 
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76-10-1601. Short tide. 
This act is the "Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act." 
1SS7 
76-10-1602, Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
U) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, busi-
ness trust, association, or other legal entity, and 
any union or group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity, and includes il-
licit as well as licit entities 
(2) Tattern of unlawful activity" means en-
gaging in conduct which constitutes the commis-
sion of at least three episodes of unlawful activ-
ity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the 
same or similar purposes, results, participants, 
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise 
are interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
tics. Taken together, the episodes shall demon-
strate continuing unlawful conduct and be re-
lated either to each other or to the enterprise At 
least one of the episodes comprising a pattern of 
unlawful activity shall have occurred after July 
31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part of 
a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this 
part shall have occurred within five years of the 
commission of the next preceding act alleged as 
pan of the pattern. 
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity 
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in 
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roperty, including state, county, and local gov-
rnznental entities 
(4) "Unlawful activity* means to directly en-
age in conduct or to solicit, request, command, 
ncourage, or intentionally aid another person to 
ngage in conduct which would constitute any 
Sense described by the following crimes or estr-
ones of crimes, or to attempt or conspire to en-
age in an act which would constitute any of 
lose offenses, regardless of whether the act is in 
id charged or indicted by any authority or is 
testified as a misdemeanor or a felony 
(a) Assault or aggravated assault, Sec-
tions 76-5-102 and 76-5-103, 
(b) A threat against life or property. Sec-
tion 76-5-107; 
(c) Criminal homicide, Sections 76-5-201, 
76-5-202, and 76-5-203, 
(d) Kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping. 
Sections 76-5-301 and 76-5-302, 
(e) Arson or aggravated arson. Sections 
76-6-102 and 76-6-103, 
(f) Causing a catastrophe. Section 
76-6-105, 
(g) Burglary or aggravated burglary, Sec-
tions 76-6-202 and 76-6-203, 
(h) Burglary of a vehicle, Section 
76-6-204; 
(i) Manufacture or possession of an instru-
ment for burglary or theR, Section 76-6-205, 
(j) Robbery or aggravated robbery, Sec-
tions 76-6-301 and 76-6-302, 
(k) Theft, Section 76-6-404, 
(1) Theft by deception, Section 76-6-405, 
(m) Theft by extortion, Section 76-6-406, 
in) Receiving stolen property, Section 
76-6-408, 
(o) Theft of services, Section 76-6-409, 
(p) Forgery, Section 76-6-501, 
(q) Fraudulent use of a credit card, Sec-
tions 76-6-506 1, 76-6-506 2, and 76-6-506 4, 
(r) Computer fraud. Part 7, Chapter 76, 
Title 6, 
(s) Bribery or receiving bribe by person in 
the business of selection, appraisal, or criti-
cism of goods, Section 76-6-508. 
(t) Bribery of a labor official. Section 
76-6-509, 
(u) Defrauding creditors. Section 
76-6-511, 
(v) Acceptance of deposit by insolvent fi-
nancial institution. Section 76-6-512, 
(w) Unlawful dealing with property by fi-
duciary, Section 76-6-513, 
(z) Bribery or threat to influence contest. 
Section 76-6-514, 
(y) Making a false credit report, Section 
76-6-517. 
(z) Cnminal simulation. Section 76-6-518. 
(as) Criminal usury. Section 76-6-520, 
(bb) False or fraudulent insurance claim. 
Section 76-6-521. 
(cc) Sale o( a child. Section 76-7-203, 
idd) Bribery to influence official or politi-
cal actions, Section 76-8-103 
(eel Threats to influence official or politi-
cal action Section 76-8-104, 
(ff) Receiving bribe or bribery b> public 
servant. Section 76-8-105, 
(ggl Receiving bnbe or bribery for en-
dorsement of person as public servant, Sec-
fhh) Official misconduct. Sections 
76-8-201 and 76^-202, 
(u) Obstructing justice. Section 76-8-306, 
(JJ) Acceptance of bnbe or bribery to pre-
vent criminal prosecution. Section 76-8-308, 
(kk> False or inconsistent material state-
ments, Section 76-8-502. 
(11) False or inconsistent statements, Sec-
tion 76-8-503, 
(mm) Written false statements, Section 
76-8-504, 
(no) Tampering with a witness, retalia-
tion against a witness or informant, or brib-
ery. Section 76-8-508. 
(oo) Extortion or bribery to dismiss crimi-
nal proceeding. Section 76-8-509, 
(pp) Tampering with evidence, Section 
76-8-510; 
(qq) Intentionally or knowingly causing 
one animal to fight with another, Subsection 
76-9-301 (1) (0. 
in) Delivery to common earner, mailing, 
or placement on premises of an infernal ma-
chine, Section 76-10-307, 
(as) Construction or possession of infernal 
machine, Section 76-10-308, 
(tt) Possession of a deadly weapon with in-
tent to assault. Section 76-10-507, 
(uu) Unlawful marking of pistol or re-
volver. Section 76-10-521; 
(w) Alteration of number or mark on pis* 
tol or revolver. Section 76-10-522; 
(ww) Forging or counterfeiting trade-
marks, trade name, or trade device, Section 
76-10-1002, 
(xx) Selling goods under counterfeited 
trademark, trade name, or trade devices, 
Section 76-10-1003, 
(yy) Sales in containers bearing registered 
trademark of substituted articles, Section 
76-10-1004, 
(zz) Selling or dealing with article bearing 
registered trademark or service mark With 
intent to defraud. Section 76-10-1006, 
(aaa) Gambling, Section 76-10-1102, 
(bob) Gambling fraud. Section 76-10-1103, 
(etc) Gambling promotion. Section 
76-10-1104, 
(ddd) Possessing s gambling device or 
record. Section 76-10-1105 
leee* Confidence game. Section 
76-10-1109. 
ifflD Distributing pornographic mstentl, 
Section 76-10-1204 
(ggg) Inducing acceptance of pornographic 
material, Section 76-10-1205, 
(hhh) Dealing in harmful materia! to I 
minor, Section 76-10-1206, 
(m) Distribution of pornographic films, 
Section 76-10-1222, 
(jD> Indecent public displays, Section 
76-10-1228, 
(kkk) Prostitution, Section 76-10-1302, 
(111) Aiding prostitution. Section 
76-10-1304 
<mmm » Exploiting prostitution. Section 
76-10-1305. 
(nnn» Aggravated exploitation of prostit* 
Hon, Section 76-10-1306, 
(ooo) Sexual exploitation of a minor, Sa> 
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(ppp) Communication* fraud. Section 
76-10-1801; 
(qqq) Any act prohibited by the criminal 
provisions of Chapter 37, Title 53, the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, or Chapter 37b, 
Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Sub-
stances Act; 
(rrr) Any act prohibited by the criminal 
provisions of Chapter 1, Title 61, the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act; 
(sea) Any act prohibited by the criminal 
provisions of Chapter 11, Title 57, the Land 
and Timeahare Sales Practices Act; 
(ttt) False claims for public assistance. 
Section 62A-9-130; 
(uuu) Any act prohibited by the criminal 
provisions of Chapter 56, Title 63, the Utah 
Procurement Code, 
(vw) Any act prohibited by the criminal 
provisions of the laws governing taxation in 
this state; 
(www) Any act prohibited by the criminal 
provisions of Chapter 12, Title 32av the Alco-
holic Beverage Control Act; 
(xxx) Any act prohibited by the criminal 
provisions of Chapter 10, Title 13, the Re-
cording Practices Act; 
(yyy) Deceptive business practices, Sec-
tion 76-6-507; and 
(zzz) Any act illegal under the lawi of the 
United States and enumerated in Title 18, 
Section 1961 (1) (B), (C), and (D) of the 
United States Code. isea 
76404603. Unlawful acta. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received 
any proceeds derived, whether directly or indirectly, 
from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the per-
son has participated as a principal, to use or invest, 
directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the 
proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from 
the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acqui-
sition of any interest in, or the establishment or oper-
ation of, any enterprise 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern 
of unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly 
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enter-
prise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or 
associated with any enterprise to conduct or partici-
pate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlaw-
ful activity. 
(4) It IB unlawful for any person to conspin to vio-
late any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (31. is*? 
76-10-1603.5. Violation a felony — Costs — For* 
feiture — Fines — Divestiture — Re-
strictions — Dissolution or reorganiza-
tion — Restraining orders and Injunc-
tions «— Hearings — 8pecial verdict — 
Findings — Judgment and order of 
forfeiture — Seizure of property — 
Sale — Proceeds — Petitions for remis-
sion or mitigation of forfeiture — Hear-
ing — Disposition. 
(1) A person who violates any provision of Section 
76-10-1603 is guilty of a second degree felony In ad-
dition to penalties prescribed by Isw, the court may 
order the person found guilty of the felony to pay to 
the state, if the attorney general brought the sction, 
or to the county, if the county sttorney brought the 
action, the costs of investigating and prosecuting the 
offense and the costs of securing the forfeitures pro-
vided for in this section. The person shall forfeit to 
the state or the county: 
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in vio-
lation of any provision of Section 76-10-1603; 
(b) any interest in* security of, claim against, 
or property or contractural right of any kind af-
fording a source of influence over any enterprise 
which the person has established, operated, con-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the conduct 
of in violation of Section 76-10-1603; and 
(c) any property constituting or derived from 
any proceeds which the person obtained, directly 
or indirectly, from the conduct constituting the 
pattern of unlawful activity or from any act or 
conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful ac-
tivity proven as part of the violation of any provi-
sion of Section 7640*1603 
(2) If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is baaed on a 
pattern of unlawful activity consisting of acta or con-
duct in violation of Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the property subject to for-
feiture under this section is limited to property, the 
seizure or forfeiture of which would not constitute a 
prior restraint on the ex erase of an affected party's 
rights under the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the 
Utah Constitution, or would not otherwise unlaw-
fully interfere with the exercise of those nghu 
(3) In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law for 
a violation of Section 76-10-1603, a defendant who 
derives profits or other proceeds from a conduct pro-
hibited by Section 76-10-1603, may be fined not more 
than twice the amount of the gross profits or other 
proceeds 
(4) Except under Subsection (2), property subject to 
criminal forfeiture under this section includes: 
(a) real property, including things growing on, 
affixed to, and found in land; and 
(b) tangible and intangible personal property 
including money, rights, privileges, interests, 
claims, and securities of any kind; 
(c> but does not include property legitimately 
exchanged for services rendered in connection 
with a defendants exercise of his rights under 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and the nght to appear and be de-
fended by counsel in criminal prosecutions guar-
anteed by Article 1, Sec. 12 of the Utah Constitu-
tion 
(5) Upon conviction for violating any provision of 
Section 76-10-1603, and m addition to am penalty 
prescribed by law and in addition to am forfeitures 
provided for in this section, the court may do any or 
all of the following* 
(a) order the person to divest himself of any 
interest in or any control, direct or indirect, of 
any enterprise, 
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the fu-
ture sctivities or investments of any person, in-
cluding prohibiting the person from engaging in 
the same type of endesvor as the enterprise en-
gaged in, to the extent the Utah Constitution and 
the Constitution of the United States permit; or 
(c) order the dissolution or reorganization of 
any enterprise 
(6) If a violation of Section 76-10-1603 is baaed on a 
pattern of unlswful activity consisting of acts or con-
duct in violstion or Section 76-10-1204. 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court ma> noi enter 
any order that would amount to a pnor restraint on 
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